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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on microeconomic problems in multilateral settings.
In the first chapter, I use a model with two local bidders and a global bidder in a simultaneous
ascending auction. I find that the simultaneous ascending auction does not allocate two het-
erogeneous objects e ciently. This result holds with and without resale and is independent of
the resale mechanism. Then I use a fixed resale mechanism with take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers after
the auction to study the e↵ects of resale on allocation e ciency. In cases where the two local
bidders win the objects ine ciently, no resale occurs. Therefore, whenever the simultaneous
ascending auction overdi↵uses the objects to the local bidders, resale cannot correct this inef-
ficiency. However, whenever the simultaneous ascending auction overconcentrates the objects
to the global bidder, the global bidder can resell the objects to the local bidders.
The second chapter studies the e↵ects of resale on the e ciency of simultaneous ascending
auctions with more general resale mechanisms. In this paper, speculation by the local bidders is
allowed in the simultaneous ascending auction. I look for e cient mechanisms in multilateral
settings, if they exist given the beliefs, and use these mechanisms as the resale mechanisms
after the auction. The simultaneous ascending auction can grossly misallocate the objects by
allocating the objects to the speculators but there exist e cient resale mechanisms that can
restore full e ciency.
In the final chapter, I use a model with a committee and two project sponsors. The commit-
tee members decide which one of the two projects to approve. Each project sponsor can choose
to disclose information about his project to select committee members. If a committee mem-
ber receives information from a sponsor, he can choose to investigate the project at a cost to
learn his own payo↵ from the project. After that, the committee members decide which project
to implement. As competition between the projects gets stronger, there is more information
disclosure from the sponsors.
Keywords: Simultaneous ascending auction, resale, group persuasion
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Musical chairs is a game in which the number of players is always more than the number
of chairs. The players are successively eliminated and one player eventually wins the game.
In elections, there are typically multiple candidates running for a given position. For most
job postings, there are more applicants than there are openings. Other examples where there
are more people competing for fewer items or positions abound. My thesis consists of three
essays in which I study two such environments using microeconomic models to study optimal
solutions in multilateral settings. In both environments that I study, there is a priori uncertainty
over what a desirable outcome would be. In addition, the rules of the game and the details of the
environment influence the extent to which this uncertainty can be resolved and the desirable
outcomes can be achieved. The first two essays deal with the e↵ects of resale on allocation
e ciency after simultaneous ascending auctions. The third essay studies the dynamics of group
persuasion.
The thesis is organized into three chapters. The first chapter deals with the challenges
of allocating multiple heterogeneous objects e ciently. Simultaneous ascending auctions have
been used to allocate electromagnetic spectrum licences in the United States and other countries
around the world. A global bidder whose value for a specific bundle of related objects is higher
than the sum of the standalone values for the objects faces the exposure problem. On the other
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hand, local bidder, who values only one object, does not face the same problem. Zheng (2012)
proposes jump bidding in simultaneous ascending auctions to help to mitigate the exposure
problem. When jump bidding is allowed, simultaneous ascending auctions overly concentrate
the objects to a global bidder and never overly di↵use the objects to local bidders. I use a fixed
resale mechanism to study the e↵ects of resale after a simultaneous ascending auction without
jump bidding. I find an equilibrium in which resale improves the allocation e ciency relative
to the benchmark equilibrium without resale. I also find that the chosen resale mechanism can
only partially mitigate the exposure problem for the global bidder. When the global bidder
loses the objects ine ciently, resale never takes place. However, whenever the global bidder
wins the objects ine ciently, he can resell the objects to the local bidders.
The second chapter investigates the e↵ects of resale in the presence of speculators who
are active bidders in the simultaneous ascending auctions. Since bans on post-auction trade
are di cult to enforce, there may be speculators who do not value the objects but wish to
make a profit through post-auction trade with other bidders who actually value the objects.
Williams (1999) extends the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) bargaining problem to multi-
lateral settings. I use this extension to look for the existence of e cient resale mechanisms
that can be used after the simultaneous ascending auction to restore e ciency. Even when the
simultaneous ascending auction grossly misallocates the objects by letting the speculators win
the auction, there exist e cient resale mechanisms that can rectify the situation and result in
e cient outcomes.
The final chapter investigates the dynamics of group persuasion. In cases where a com-
mittee is making a decision, strategies for persuading the individuals in the committee can be
di↵erent from the strategies for persuading a single decision maker. Selective communication,
where the sponsor of an idea or project talks to select committee members only, and persuasion
cascades, where the sponsor targets key committee members and obtains their approval before
using their support for his project to convince the other committee members to approve his
project, may be used for group persuasion. I study the problem where a committee decides
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which of two projects to approve. A sponsor of a project can choose to disclose information
about his project to select committee members. Each committee member can investigate a
project at a cost, if he receives information from the project’s sponsor, and learn his own payo↵
from implementing the project. Then, the committee members vote which project to approve.
I find that stronger competition between the sponsors leads to more information disclosure to
the committee members.
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Chapter 2
Simultaneous ascending auction with
resale
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the e↵ects of resale on a simultaneous ascending auction. A simulta-
neous ascending auction is an auction format that allows a seller of multiple heterogeneous
objects to sell these objects simultaneously, yet separately. Each object is auctioned via an
English auction; these English auctions are held simultaneously. Although there is only one
seller, there is no coordination across the separate English auctions. This auction format was
first adopted by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1994 to sell electro-
magnetic spectrum licences. Since then, the simultaneous ascending auction has become one
of the standard methods to conduct spectrum auctions in the US and around the world. Fur-
thermore, a version of the simultaneous ascending auction has also been used to sell divisible
goods in electricity and gas markets.
In such an auction with multiple objects, there may be local bidders and global bidders. A
local bidder values only one particular object, whereas a global bidder’s payo↵ from winning
his desired bundle of related objects is higher than the sum of the standalone values for the
4
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objects if those objects are complementary. This synergy may arise due to various reasons. In
the case of spectrum licences, for example, a nationwide telecommunications company may
be able to reduce its costs if it can win licences to operate in adjacent geographic regions. Al-
though complementarities between objects can give a global bidder a boost in payo↵, they also
create a dilemma for him. In a simultaneous ascending auction, when the price of an object is
above its standalone value and the prices of the other objects in a global bidder’s desired bundle
are still uncertain, should he continue bidding or drop out? If he is an aggressive competitor
and continues to bid in the auction, the complementary objects may turn out to be so expensive
that he ends up getting a negative payo↵ from acquiring his desired bundle. However, if he
chooses to be cautious and drops out now, he then loses the opportunity to possibly acquire
his desired bundle at a total price that gives him a positive payo↵. The upshot of this is that
the auction’s e ciency may be adversely a↵ected. Meng and Gunay (2017) use simulation
methods and show that, in some cases, the probability of ine cient allocations in the simulta-
neous ascending auction can be up to 9 percent. The problem that each global bidder faces is
known as the exposure problem. Goeree and Lien (2014) document some disadvantages which
result from the exposure problem that were previously unknown for the simultaneous ascend-
ing auction: this auction format can lead to outcomes in which local bidders win the objects at
very low prices, and more bidders competing in the auction may actually decrease the seller’s
revenue.
Resale has been proposed as a solution to the problem of ine ciency of auctions in general
because the possibility of resale may mitigate ine ciency. Most of the work in the economics
literature on auctions with resale focus on single-object auctions. Hafalir and Krishna (2008)
study how resale a↵ects the revenue and e ciency outcomes of first-price auctions. In their
model, resale happens through monopoly pricing where the winner of the first-price auction
makes a take-it-or-leave-it o↵er to the loser. Interestingly and perhaps surprisingly, Hafalir and
Krishna show that resale may actually decrease e ciency. Garratt and Tro¨ger (2006) inves-
tigate how a speculator a↵ects standard auctions with resale. A speculator is a bidder who is
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commonly known to have zero value for the object being auctioned. In first-price and Dutch
auctions with resale, they conclude that speculators do not profit and that the opportunity to
resell the good after the auction can be detrimental to e ciency. However, in second-price and
English auctions, there are multiple equilibria: the e cient equilibrium in which bidders bid
their values exists, along with ine cient equilibria in which the speculator wins the auction
and makes a positive profit from resale. With collusion in English auctions, Garratt, Tro¨ger,
and Zheng (2009) find that even a high-value bidder prefers collusion to value-bidding in the
auction when the spoils from collusion are divided among members of the bidding ring through
an arbitrary resale mechanism that the reseller is free to choose. However, the equilibria con-
structed are less e cient than the value-bidding equilibrium, so the possibility of resale creates
ine ciency.
The literature on multiple-object auctions, however, has largely ignored resale even though
resale of spectrum licences has indeed occurred1 and bans on post-auction trade are di cult, if
not impossible, to enforce.2
Xu, Levin, and Ye (2012) study auctions with synergy and resale. In their model, there
are two objects and two global bidders. The two objects are sold sequentially via second-price
sealed bid auctions; each bidder only learns his value for the second object being auctioned
after the first auction. After both auctions, resale occurs either as a monopoly or as a monop-
sony take-it-or-leave-it o↵er. They find that the resale mechanism has an impact on bidding
strategies in the auctions: whereas no equilibrium in which the bidders reveal their types with
positive probability exists under a monopoly take-it-or-leave-it o↵er in the resale stage, the bid-
ders are willing to use increasing bidding strategies in equilibrium under a monopsony take-it-
or-leave-it o↵er in the resale stage. However, the e↵ect of resale on the probability of exposure
is ambiguous in the latter case. In addition, we note that there is su cient information revealed
through their model of the sequential auctions that it is clear in some cases immediately after
the auctions whether resale can generate a higher surplus.
1See, for example, Cramton (2004).
2See Hafalir and Krishna (2009).
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Filiz-Ozbay, Lopez-Vargas, and Ozbay (2015) use experiments to study multiple-object
auctions with resale with multiple local bidders and a global bidder with private information.
They consider two cases: a generalized Vickrey auction that allows package bidding followed
by resale and simultaneous second-price auctions followed by resale. In both cases, resale takes
place in the form of take-it-or-leave it o↵ers made by the winners. In the case of a generalized
Vickrey auction followed by resale, an equilibrium that allocates the objects e ciently in the
auction stage exists. However, when the objects are auctioned via simultaneous second-price
sealed bid auctions, the final allocation is ine cient even after post-auction trade.
Various resale mechanisms have been studied in the literature. As noted above, Garratt,
Tro¨ger, and Zheng (2009) allow the winner of the auction to choose an arbitrary resale mecha-
nism. This is rare in the literature: the other main paper in the literature that allows the reseller
of the good to choose his resale mechanism is Zheng (2002). In that paper, there are multiple
stages where resale can occur; the current owner of the good at each stage is allowed to choose
his resale mechanism. In most papers, however, a resale mechanism is specified and bidders
have no say in that choice of mechanism. In this paper, we take the approach of using a fixed
resale mechanism as well.
In this paper, we study the problem theoretically with local bidders and a global bidder
who participate in a simultaneous ascending auction. The global bidder su↵ers from the expo-
sure problem in our model and we investigate if resale mitigates the exposure problem for this
global bidder. We fix the mechanism by which post-auction trade can take place and analyze
whether the opportunity of resale improves the allocation e ciency. Resale through the fixed
resale mechanism does not completely mitigate the exposure problem for the global bidder be-
cause resale never takes places whenever the global bidder loses both objects ine ciently (see
Propositions 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). However, the global bidder can resell the objects to the other bid-
ders whenever he wins both objects ine ciently. We prove that there exists an equilibrium in
which resale improves the allocation e ciency relative to the benchmark equilibrium without
resale (see Proposition 2.7.1).
8 Chapter 2. Simultaneous ascending auction with resale
2.2 Benchmark: Simultaneous ascending auction
2.2.1 Model
The simultaneous ascending auction is modelled as in Zheng (2012). There are two objects that
are denoted by A and B. There are two categories of bidders: local bidders who value only one
object and global bidders for whom the two objects are complements. There are three bidders:
1, 2 and 3. Bidder 1 values only object A and bidder 2 values only object B. Their values for
the objects, denoted by v1A and v2B respectively, are identically and independently distributed
on [0, v] according to a continuous distribution FL. For simplicity, bidder 1 is not allowed to
bid for object B and bidder 2 is not allowed to bid for object A. Bidder 3 is a global bidder. His
standalone value for each object is 0. His value for the package of both objects,   2 [0, 2v],
is drawn from a continuous distribution FG. The values v1A, v2B and   are private information;
everything else is commonly known.
Each bidder’s payo↵ is equal to his value of the object(s) he eventually owns minus his
total payment.
The two objects are auctioned via separate English auctions which start simultaneously.
Each English auction is modelled by the “clock model” as in Albano, Germano, and Lovo
(2001). In the separate English auctions, the prices pA and pB start at 0 and increase at the
same exogenous speed. When a bidder drops out from an auction for a given object, the
clock stops temporarily in both auctions, and all bidders have a chance to exit at the same
price. Ties are broken in favour of the global bidder. When there is only one bidder left in
the auction for object j, where j 2 {A, B}, the object is then sold to the remaining bidder at
the current price. The bidders’ actions during the separate English auctions are commonly
observed. Consequently, at the end of the simultaneous ascending auction, each bidder knows
the identities of the winners and the prices paid by these winners to the auctioneer.
We use perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept in this paper. We consider
pure strategies only. In the auction stage, each bidder decides the price(s) at which he should
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drop out of the English auction(s).
2.2.2 Equilibrium
First, we show that the simultaneous ascending auction cannot allocate the objects e ciently.
Proposition 2.2.1 (Corollary of Proposition 2 of Zheng (2012)) There is no equilibrium in
which the simultaneous ascending auction allocates the objects e ciently in the auction stage
of the game.
Proof Suppose that there exists an equilibrium in which the objects are allocated e ciently in
the auction stage. In this equilibrium, let bi j(v) be the price at which bidder i with value v drops
out of the auction for object j when every other bidder is still participating in the simultaneous
ascending auction.
Consider a realization of values (v1A, v2B,  ) where v1A + v2B <  . Then e ciency requires
that bidder 3 wins both objects in the simultaneous ascending auction. This implies that at least
one of the following two inequalities has to hold:
b1A(v1A) < b3A( ) (2.1)
b2B(v2B) < b3B( ) (2.2)
Assume that Inequality (2.1) is true. This assumption is without loss of generality because In-
equality (2.2) must be true otherwise and that case is symmetric to the case we are considering.
Next, consider a realization of values (v1A, v02B,  ), where v1A and   are as above and v
0
2B is
such that v1A + v02B >  . In this case, e ciency requires that the local bidders win the objects in
the simultaneous ascending auction. Therefore, both the following inequalities should hold:
b1A(v1A) > b3A( ) (2.3)
b2B(v02B) > b3B( )
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Note that Inequality (2.3) contradicts Inequality (2.1) from the previous case. Therefore, an
equilibrium that allocates the objects e ciently in the simultaneous ascending auction cannot
exist.
The result of the above proposition is quite general. In fact, it holds with and without resale
in the game. Moreover, the proof does not depend on the details of the post-auction trade
mechanism.
Since the simultaneous ascending auction cannot allocate the objects e ciently, for the
remainder of the paper, we consider resale and investigate whether resale can improve the
allocation e ciency.
Proposition 1 of Zheng (2012) describes a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. This is used as
the benchmark for the simultaneous ascending auction without resale in this paper.
2.3 Model: Simultaneous ascending auction with resale
We study the allocation e ciency with the following fixed resale mechanism after the auction
stage.
After the simultaneous ascending auction, the bidders are allowed to trade sequentially in a
fixed order. In the resale stage, the winners of the objects in the auction make take-it-or-leave-it
o↵ers to the potential buyers. While all the bidders observe if an object has been sold or not in
the resale stage, a bidder not involved in the post-auction trade does not observe the sale price.
The order of trade in the resale stage depends on the allocation of the objects after the auction.
• If the local bidders have won in the auction, bidder 1 can sell object A to bidder 3 before
bidder 2 can sell object B to bidder 3.
• If the global bidder has won one of the objects, the local bidder who has won the other
object can sell that object to bidder 3 before bidder 3 can sell to the other local bidder.
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• If the global bidder has won both objects, he can sell the objects to the local bidders. First,
the global bidder makes take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers to the local bidders simultaneously.
Then the local bidders simultaneously accept or reject the o↵ers. Finally, the global
bidder decides whether to trade or not.
In the resale stage, a local bidder who has won an object in the auction chooses the price
at which he wants to sell the object to the global bidder; a local bidder who has not won an
object in the auction decides whether to accept the global bidder’s take-it-or-leave-it o↵er if
the global bidder makes an o↵er. If the global bidder has not won anything in the auction, he
decides whether to accept the take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers made by the local bidders. If he has won
an object in the auction, first he has to decide whether to accept the take-it-or-leave-it o↵er
made by the local bidder who has won the other object in the auction, then he chooses the price
at which he wants to o↵er the object(s) that he currently owns to the other local bidder. If the
global bidder has won both objects in the auction, he chooses the take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers to
the local bidders and decides whether to trade with the local bidders after they have chosen
whether to accept or reject his o↵ers.
2.4 Improbability of resale
Since bidder 1 is not allowed to bid for object B and bidder 2 is not allowed to bid for object
A, there are four possible allocations after the simultaneous ascending auction.
1. Bidder 1 has object A; bidder 2 has object B.
2. Bidder 1 has object A; bidder 3 has object B.
3. Bidder 3 has object A; bidder 2 has object B.
4. Bidder 3 has both objects A and B.
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Consider the first case where the local bidders have won the objects in the auction. This is a
case of sequential common agency, where the global bidder is the common agent. Since each
bidder learns some information about the other bidders’ private values during the auction, the
beliefs about the other bidders’ values may be updated after the auction. As the following
propositions show, there is zero probability of resale when the objects are owned by the local
bidders.
First, I show the result for a special case where bidder 3’s value is common knowledge. The
result for this special case is used later in Lemma 2.4.3, and its proof is much more transparent
than for the case where bidder 3’s value is uncertain.
Proposition 2.4.1 Let v1A > 0 and v2B > 0 with probability 1. Suppose bidder 1 has object
A and bidder 2 has object B. Suppose also that bidder 3’s value   is commonly known. Then
there is zero probability of resale in equilibrium.
Proof If bidder 3 has bought object A from bidder 1, it is optimal for bidder 2 to sell object B
to bidder 3 at the price of   if   > v2B and to keep object B otherwise since   is revealed when
bidder 3 drops out of the auction. If bidder 1 charges bpA and bidder 2 charges bpB, bidder 3’s
payo↵ from buying object A from bidder 1 and object B from bidder 2 is
    bpA   bpB =     bpA     =  bpA.
This is non-negative only if bpA = 0. However, with probability 1, bidder 1’s value for object A
is more than 0 so it is not optimal for him to charge 0 for object A. Therefore, resale happens
with zero probability in equilibrium.
It is not essential in the above proposition that bidder 3’s value is commonly known. In fact,
the same result holds when bidder 3’s value is private information, as the following proposition
shows. Although it may appear that there is redundancy in having two propositions with the
same result, the above proposition, where it is assumed that bidder 3’s value is commonly
known, is used in the proof of Lemma 2.4.3.
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Proposition 2.4.2 Let v1A > 0 and v2B > 0 with probability 1. Suppose bidder 1 has object A
and bidder 2 has object B. Suppose also that bidder 3’s value   2 [ ,  ] is private information.
Then there is zero probability of resale in equilibrium.
Proof Suppose to the contrary that there exists an equilibrium in which resale occurs with
strictly positive probability. We can then characterize this equilibrium in the following way.
Suppose it is optimal for bidder 1 with value v1A to sell object A in such a way that the
probability that bidder 3 buys object A from him is
p3A(v1A,  ) =
8>>>><>>>>: 1 if    b 1(v1A)0 if   <b 1(v1A)
whereb 1(v1A) 2 R+. If object A is not sold to bidder 3, it is not profitable for bidder 3 to buy
object B from bidder 2 unless bidder 2 o↵ers to sell the object at the price of 0. However, since
v2B > 0 with probability 1, it is with probability 1 that bidder 2 is unwilling to sell object B
at the price of 0. Therefore, there is zero probability of resale if bidder 3 does not buy object
A from bidder 1. On the other hand, conditional on object A being sold to bidder 3 earlier in
the resale stage, suppose it is optimal for bidder 2 with value v2B to sell object B so that the
probability that bidder 3 buys object B from him is
p3B(v2B,  ) =
8>>>><>>>>: 1 if    b 2(v2B)0 if   <b 2(v2B)
whereb 2(v2B) 2 R+. The take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers from bidders 1 and 2 to bidder 3 result in the
outcomes described above. Since we are considering pure strategies only, restricting attention
to take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers is without loss of generality. In particular, note that if it is optimal
for bidder 3 with value   to accept the o↵er at a certain price, it must be optimal for bidder 3
with value  0, where  0 >  , to accept the o↵er as well since he has a higher value and he pays
the same price for the object.
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First, we establish some properties of b 2(v2B). For all v2B, b 2(v2B)    . Otherwise, there
exists v2B such that bidder 2 posts a price b 2(v2B) <  . In this case, p3B(v2B,  ) = 1 for all
  2 [ ,  ]. However, if bidder 2 sets the price at   instead, it remains true that p3B(v2B,  ) = 1
for all   2 [ ,  ]. This is a profitable deviation. Ifb 2(v2B) >   for all v2B, p3B(v2B,  ) = 0 for all
  2 [ ,  ]. Since bidder 3 anticipates that there is no resale of object B, he is unwilling to buy
object A from bidder 1 unless the price is 0 which occurs with probability 0 since v1A > 0 with
probability 1. The upshot is that there is no resale and we are done. Therefore, for the rest of
the proof, we focus on the case where   b 2(v2B)   .
The profit of bidder 2 with v2B who o↵ers to sell object B at the priceb 2(v2B) is
⇡2(b 2(v2B), v2B) = [1   F3(b 2(v2B))][b 2(v2B)   v2B] + v2B
where F3 describes the distribution of   conditional on bidder 3 having bought object A. For
bidder 2’s profit to be positive, b 2(v2B)   v2B in case of resale. Moreover, b 2(v2B) is non-
decreasing in v2B. To see why this is the case, consider v2B and v02B, where v
0
2B , v2B. Then, the
inequalities
⇡2(b 2(v2B), v2B)   ⇡2(b 2(v02B), v2B)
and
⇡2(b 2(v02B), v02B)   ⇡2(b 2(v2B), v02B)
have to hold. After adding the two inequalities and some simplification, we obtain
[F3(b 2(v02B))   F3(b 2(v2B))](v02B   v2B)   0.
If v02B > v2B, then F3(b 2(v02B))   F3(b 2(v2B)). If F3(b 2(v02B)) > F3(b 2(v2B)), then b 2(v02B) >b 2(v2B) since F3 is non-decreasing. On the other hand, if F3(b 2(v02B)) = F3(b 2(v2B)), thenb 2(v02B) = b 2(v2B). To see why this is the case, supposeb 2(v02B) < b 2(v2B). Then bidder 2 with
value v02B is selling to the same types of bidder 3 as bidder 2 with value v2B but at a lower price.
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Chargingb 2(v2B) is a profitable deviation. Therefore,b 2(v02B)  b 2(v2B).
Furthermore, it is never optimal for bidder 2 to sell the object at the price of 0. Since
b 2(v2B)   b 2(0) for all v2B, it su ces to show that b 2(0) > 0. We know that b 2(0)       0
because we are considering the case whereb 2(v2B)     for all v2B. In particular, if   > 0, we
are done. Next, consider the case where   = 0. If bidder 2 with v2B = 0 sells object B at the
price of 0, his profit is 0. If F3(✏) = 1 for all ✏ > 0, then it means that the resale of object A
happens with zero probability. Otherwise, there exists ✏ > 0 such that F3(✏) < 1. Therefore, if
bidder 2 raises the resale price of object B to ✏, his profit is
⇡2(✏, 0) = [1   F3(✏)]✏ > 0,
so this is a profitable deviation. Therefore,b 2(v2B) > 0 for all v2B.
Denote bidder 3’s continuation payo↵ conditional on   from having object A as U3( ).
More specifically,
U3( ) = Ev2B[p3B(v2B,  )]    Ev2B[T (v2B,  )]
where T (v2B,  ) is the transfer from bidder 3 to bidder 2 conditional on (v2B,  ). By a standard
argument, we can show that Ev2B[p3B(v2B,  )] is weakly increasing in   and
U3( ) = U3( ) +
Z  
 
Ev2B[p3B(v2B, t)] dt
so U3( ) is weakly increasing in  .
Next, we establish some properties of b 1(v1A). For all v1A, b 1(v1A)    . Otherwise, there
exists v1A such that bidder 1 with v1A o↵ers object A at the price s1(v1A) < U3( ). In this case,
p3A(v1A,  ) = 1 for all   2 [ ,  ]. However, if s1(v1A) = U3( ) instead, it remains true that
p3A(v1A,  ) = 1 for all   2 [ ,  ]. This is a profitable deviation. If b 1(v1A)     for all v1A,
p3A(v1A,  ) = 0 for all   2 [ ,  ). Then there is no resale with probability 1 and we are done.
Therefore, for the rest of the proof, we focus on the case where   b 1(v1A) <  .
16 Chapter 2. Simultaneous ascending auction with resale
In addition, it is never optimal for bidder 1 to sell the object at the price of 0. Using a
revealed preference argument as above, we can show that s1(v1A) is non-decreasing. Therefore,
it su ces to show that s1(0) > 0. If bidder 1 with v1A = 0 sells object A at the price of
0, his profit is 0. Since resale is assumed to occur with strictly positive probability in this
equilibrium, there exists a set S of positive probability measure such that Ev2B[p3B(v2B,  )] > 0
for every   2 S. Therefore, there exists ↵ 2 ( ,  ) such that Pr{S \ ( ,↵)} , 0 and
U3(↵) = U3( ) +
Z ↵
 
Ev2B[p3B(v2B, t)] dt > U3( )   0.
However, if bidder 1 raises the price to U3(↵), his profit is
⇡1(U3(↵), 0) = Pr{    ↵}U3(↵) > 0,
so this is a profitable deviation. Hence, s1(v1A) > 0 for all v1A.
Let  
1
= infv1A b 1(v1A) and let  2 = infv2B b 2(v2B). First, we show that  1 =  2. If not,
 
1
<  
2
or  
1
>  
2
. First consider the case where  
1
<  
2
. Then, if   2 ( 
1
,  
2
), there
is a strictly positive probability that bidder 3 buys object A and expects to be unable to buy
object B. Since his standalone value for object A is 0, he is only willing to buy object A if
bidder 1 charges 0 for it. However, as shown above, this is never optimal for bidder 1. Hence,
for all v1A, p3A(v1A,  ) = 0 if   2 ( 1,  2), contradicting the fact that there exists v1A such
that b 1(v1A) 2 ( 1,  2) so p3A(v1A,  ) = 1 for   2 [b 1(v1A),  2). Now consider the case where
 
1
>  
2
. Then, if   2 ( 
2
,  
1
), bidder 3 buys object A with zero probability on the equilibrium
path. Therefore, it is not optimal for bidder 2 with v2B such that b 2(v2B) 2 ( 2,  1) to set the
price atb 2(v2B) since he can raise the price to  1 and sell to the same types and thus get a higher
profit. Note that  
1
<   since we are focusing on the case where    b 1(v1A) <  ; therefore,
this event is on the equilibrium path.
Let  
1
=  
2
= e . Since  
2
= infv2B b 2(v2B)  b 2(0) > 0,e  > 0. Ife  =  , then the probability
of resale is 0. Therefore, consider the case where e  <  . Bidder 3 with   = e  +  , where
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0 <   < min{    e , 1
2
s1(0)}, has a strictly positive probability of buying both objects. His
payo↵ is
    s1(v1A)  b 2(v2B)  e  +     s1(0)  e  <  12 s1(0) < 0.
On the other hand, he gets 0 if he does not buy the objects, so he would rather not buy the
objects. This contradicts the definition of p3A(v1A,  ) and p3B(v2B,  ). Therefore, there can be
no resale with positive probability in equilibrium.
The two propositions above show that resale does not take place when the objects are
“overly di↵used”3 to the local bidders after the auction. This is because at least one of the
sellers demands the entire share of the global bidder’s value for the package of objects. This
problem is known as the “holdout problem” in the literature.4 Therefore, if the global bidder
drops out of the simultaneous ascending auction before he is sure that it is not e cient for him
to own the objects, there is no guarantee that the equilibrium allocation of the entire game is
indeed e cient.
On the other hand, if bidder 3 wins at least one object in the simultaneous ascending auc-
tion, the next proposition determines the outcomes of resale depending on the post-auction
ownership of the objects and shows that the allocation after resale is e cient as long as the
losers reveal their values in the auction. One way of achieving this revelation of values is for
all the bidders to use separating strategies in the auction. More specifically, bidders use bid-
ding functions in the auction stage such that bi j(v) , bi j(v0) if v , v0 for all v, v0 in the support
of bidder i’s value, where bi j(v) is the price at which bidder i with value v drops out of the
auction for object j. This result will be used in the next section to show that no such separating
equilibrium exists.
Lemma 2.4.3 Suppose all bidders use separating strategies in the auction stage. Let pA and
pB be the respective prices at which objects A and B are sold in the simultaneous ascending
3Zheng (2012) coins the term “overdi↵usion” to describe the following kind of ine ciency: two objects go to
two separate bidders when, in our notation,   > v1A + v2B.
4See, for example, Kominers and Weyl (2012).
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auction. Then, the following hold.
1. If bidder 1 has object A and bidder 2 has object B after the auction, the bidders’ payo↵s
after the resale stage are (v1A   pA, v2B   pB, 0).
2. If bidder 1 has object A and bidder 3 has object B after the auction, the bidders’ payo↵s
after the resale stage are (max{    v2B, v1A}   pA, 0, v2B   pB).
3. If bidder 3 has object A and bidder 2 has object B after the auction, the bidders’ payo↵s
after the resale stage are (0,max{    v1A, v2B}   pB, v1A   pA).
4. If bidder 3 has objects A and B after the auction, the bidders’ payo↵s after the resale
stage are (0, 0,max{ , v1A + v2B}   pA   pB).
Moreover, in cases 2, 3 and 4, the allocation is e cient.
Proof Since all bidders use separating strategies in the auction stage, a bidder’s value is re-
vealed when he drops out of the auction.
In case 1, bidder 3’s value for the package of objects is known whereas the values of bidders
1 and 2 remain unknown. By Proposition 2.4.1, there is zero probability of resale in equilib-
rium. Therefore, the bidders’ payo↵s are (v1A   pA, v2B   pB, 0) since bidders 1 and 2 paid pA
and pB in the auction.
In case 2, bidder 2’s value, v2B, and bidder 3’s value,  , are known. According to the fixed
mechanism for post-auction trade, bidder 1 can sell object A to bidder 3 before bidder 3 can
sell to bidder 2. We solve the game from the back. If bidder 3 has object B only, he can sell
the object to bidder 2 at the price of v2B since this is the highest price that bidder 2 is willing to
pay for the object. Then, the bidders’ payo↵s are
(v1A   pA, 0, v2B   pB). (2.4)
On the other hand, if bidder 3 has bought object A from bidder 1 at the price of bpA, his payo↵ is
   pB bpA if he keeps both objects and v2B  pB bpA if he sells object B to bidder 2. Therefore,
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bidder 3 sells object B if   < v2B. In either case, bidder 2’s payo↵ is 0. Now consider the first
part of the resale stage where bidder 1 can sell object A to bidder 3. First consider the case
where   < v2B. If bidder 3 buys object A at the price of bpA, his payo↵ is v2B   pB   bpA; if he
doesn’t buy object A, his payo↵ is v2B  pB as shown in (2.4). Therefore, it is optimal for bidder
3 to buy object A if and only if bpA  0. There is no trade in this case if v1A > 0. On the other
hand, if v1A = 0, bidder 1 may be willing to trade at bpA = 0, but such a trade does not change
the payo↵s. Now consider the case where     v2B. If bidder 3 buys object A from bidder 1 at
the price of bpA, his payo↵ is    pB  bpA; if he doesn’t buy object A, his payo↵ is v2B   pB from
(2.4). Therefore, bidder 3 buys object A from bidder 1 if bpA     v2B. If there is indeed a sale,bpA =     v2B. If bidder 1 sells object A to bidder 3 at the price of bpA =     v2B, his payo↵ is
   v2B   pA; if he keeps object A, his payo↵ is v1A   pA. Therefore, it is optimal for bidder 1 to
sell object A to bidder 3 if   > v1A + v2B. Consequently, if   > v1A + v2B, bidder 1 sells object A
to bidder 3 at the price of     v2B and bidder 3 keeps both objects, so the bidders’ payo↵s are
(    v2B   pA, 0, v2B   pB).
On the other hand, if   < v1A+v2B, bidder 1 keeps object A and bidder 3 sells object B to bidder
2 at the price of v2B, so the bidders’ payo↵s are
(v1A   pA, 0, v2B   pB).
In the case where   = v1A+v2B, the payo↵s are the same under either of the above two scenarios.
Therefore, the bidders’ payo↵s are (max{    v2B, v1A}   pA, 0, v2B   pB) and the allocation is
e cient.
Case 3 is symmetric to case 2.
Finally, in case 4, bidders 1 and 2 have revealed their values, v1A and v2B respectively, when
they dropped out of the auction. If bidder 3 keeps the objects, his payo↵ is     pA   pB. Since
bidder 1 is willing to pay up to v1A for object A and bidder 2 is willing to pay up to v2B for
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object B, bidder 3’s payo↵ is v1A+v2B  pA  pB if he sells both objects. Therefore, it is optimal
for bidder 3 to sell the objects to the other two bidders if   > v1A + v2B. Since bidders 1 and 2
have to pay v1A and v2B respectively if bidder 3 sells the objects to them, they get 0 regardless
of whether they participate in post-auction trade or not. Therefore, the bidders’ payo↵s are
(0, 0,max{ , v1A + v2B}   pA   pB) and the allocation is e cient.
In the lemma above, a key assumption is that the losers in the auction reveal their values.
With such information, whenever bidder 3 owns at least one object at the beginning of the resale
stage (i.e. when there is no common agency problem), resale happens whenever it is e cient
for the winners to sell the objects. Therefore, if the bidders are willing to use strategies that
reveal their values if they lose in the auction in equilibrium, resale can improve the allocation
e ciency and partially mitigate the exposure problem for the global bidder. Every loser in the
auction gets a payo↵ of 0 after resale since the winner can take advantage of this revelation by
selling the object to the loser at the highest price the loser is willing to pay for the object. As
such, bidders are unwilling to reveal their values in the auction in equilibrium.
2.5 E ciency with strictly increasing strategies
In this section and the next section, we assume that the bidders’ values are continuously dis-
tributed.
Proposition 2.5.1 Let v1A and v2B be distributed continuously on [0, 1] according to FL and  
be distributed continuously on [0, 2] according to FG. Suppose b1A(x) = b2B(x) for all x and
b3A( ) = b3B( ) for all  , where bi j(v) is the price at which bidder i with value v drops out of the
auction for object j when every other bidder is still participating in the simultaneous ascending
auction. Then there exists no equilibrium in which the bidders use strictly increasing strategies
in the auction stage.
Proof Suppose there is an equilibrium in which the bidders use strictly increasing strategies
in the auction stage. To simplify notation, let b1A(x) = b2B(x) = bL(x) for all x and b3A( ) =
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b3B( ) = bG( ) for all  . Define the following functions and bounds:
b 1L (y) = sup{v : bL(v)  y},
BL = max{y : FL(b 1L (y)) = 0},
b 1G (y) = sup{  : bG( )  y};
BG = max{y : FG(b 1G (y)) = 0}.
where y 2 R+. The inverse functions defined above are continuous, thus the lower bounds
of the bids are well-defined. Then there are three cases to consider: BL > BG, BL < BG and
BL = BG.
1. BL > BG.
Defineb  as
b  = sup{  : bG( ) < BL}.
Consider bidder 1 with v1A such that 0 < v1A <
1
2
E[bG( )|  2 [0,b )]. Then, bL(v1A) > BL;
this implies that, in equilibrium, each of the three bidders may drop out of the auction
first. Consider the following three events5 which are conditional on v1A:
(a) Event E1: Bidder 1 drops out before bidders 2 and 3.
Bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 1’s value is revealed because all the bidders use
separating strategies. By Lemma 2.4.3, bidder 1’s payo↵ is 0 regardless of whether
bidder 2 or bidder 3 wins object B in the auction.
(b) Event E2: Bidder 2 drops out before bidders 1 and 3.
Bidder 2 reveals his value and bidder 3 wins object B. Since the local bidders are
5Since all the bidders are using separating strategies in the auction, cases where at least two bidders drop out
simultaneously occur with zero probability.
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using symmetric separating strategies, it must be the case that v2B < v1A. Therefore,
Pr{E2}  Pr{v2B < v1A|v1A} = FL(v1A).
By Lemma 2.4.3, bidder 1 gets max{    v2B, v1A}   pA, where pA is the price at
which object A is sold in the auction, if he wins object A in the auction and 0 if he
loses object A in the auction. Therefore, the maximum he can get is 2.
(c) Event E3: Bidder 3 drops out before bidders 1 and 2.
Since bidder 3 drops out first with probability 1 if   <b ,
Pr{E3}   Pr{  <b }.
By Proposition 2.4.1, there is zero probability of resale. So bidder 1’s expected
payo↵ is at most v1A   E[bG( )|  2 [0,b )].
Let bidder 1’s payo↵ conditional on v1A be denoted by U1(v1A). Then,
U1(v1A)  Pr{E1}(0) + Pr{E2}(2) + Pr{E3}(v1A   pA)
 2FL(v1A) + Pr{  <b }  12E[bG( )|  2 [0,b )]   E[bG( )|  2 [0,b )]
!
 2FL(v1A)   12 Pr{  <b }E[bG( )|  2 [0,b )].
First, note that
1
2
Pr{  < b }E[bG( )|  2 [0,b )] > 0. In addition, FL is continuous,
2FL(0) = 0 and 2FL(1) = 2. By the intermediate value theorem, there exists   2 (0, 1)
such that 2FL(v1A)   12 Pr{  < b }E[bG( )|  2 [0,b )] < 0 for all v1A 2 (0,  ). Therefore,
for su ciently small v1A, U1(v1A) < 0. Since dropping out of the auction when the price
is 0 is a profitable deviation, it cannot be the case that BL > BG in equilibrium.
2. BL < BG.
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Consider bidder 1 with su ciently small v1A > 0 such that Pr{  < v2B} > FL(v1A) and
BL < bL(v1A) < BG. We know by the intermediate value theorem that such v1A exist.
6 In
this case, events E1, E2 and E3 are defined similarly as above. First, bidder 1’s payo↵
is 0 in event E1. Secondly, Pr{E2}  FL(v1A) as above. Moreover, by cases (2) and (4)
of Lemma 2.4.3, the post-resale allocation is e cient. Therefore, bidder 1 has object A
after the resale stage with probability Pr{v1A + v2B >  |v1A, E2}. Let bidder 1’s expected
transfer in this event be denoted by T1(v1A, E2). Thirdly, since bL(v1A) < BG, Pr{E3} = 0.
Therefore, bidder 1’s payo↵ is
U1(v1A) = Pr{E1}(0) + Pr{E2}[Pr{v1A + v2B >  |v1A, E2}v1A + T1(v1A, E2)]
 Pr{E2}[v1A + T1(v1A, E2)].
If bidder 1 with v1A = 0 deviates and drops out of the auction at the price at which bidder
1 with v1A > 0 drops out and rejects all resale o↵ers in event E1, his payo↵ is
Ud1 (0) = Pr{E2}T1(v1A, E2).
On the other hand, if v1A = 0, bidder 1’s payo↵ is
U1(0) = T1(0)   0
where T1(0) is the expected transfer conditional on v1A = 0. If bidder 1 with v1A > 0
deviates to the strategy of bidder 1 with v1A = 0, his payo↵ is
Ud1 (v1A) = Pr{  < v2B}v1A + T1(0).
6Since v2B 2 [0, 1] and   2 [0, 2], 0 < Pr{  < v2B} < 1. In addition, FL is continuous, FL(0) = 0 and
FL(1) = 1. Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists ✏ 2 (0, 1) such that Pr{  < v2B} > FL(v1A)
for all v1A 2 (0, ✏).
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Then bidder 1 has a profitable deviation because
U1(v1A)  Pr{E2}v1A + T1(0)
 FL(v1A)v1A + T1(0)
< Pr{  < v2B}v1A + T1(0)
= Ud1 (v1A).
where the first inequality holds because U1(0)   Ud1 (0) by incentive compatibility.
3. BL = BG.
We show that bidder 1 also has a profitable deviation in this case, thus this cannot be
an equilibrium. The argument we use here is similar to the argument above for the case
where BL < BG. The di↵erence is that, in this case, it is possible for bidder 3 to drop
out before bidders 1 and 2. If bidder 3 is the first to drop out, bG( ) < bL(v1A) and
bG( ) < bL(v2B) have to hold simultaneously.
Pr{E3} = Pr{bG( ) < bL(v1A), bG( ) < bL(v2B)|v1A}
< Pr{bG( ) < bL(v1A)|v1A}
= Pr{  < b 1G (bL(v1A))}
= FG(b 1G (bL(v1A))).
Moreover, by Proposition 2.4.1, there is zero probability of resale after the auction.
Therefore, bidder 1 consumes object A and we denote his expected transfer in this case
as T1(v1A, E3).
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For bidder 1 with v1A > 0,
U1(v1A) = Pr{E1}(0) + Pr{E2}[Pr{v1A + v2B >  |v1A, E2}v1A + T1(v1A, E2)]
+Pr{E3}[v1A + T1(v1A, E3)].
If bidder 1 with v1A = 0 deviates and drops out of the auction at the price at which bidder
1 with v1A > 0 drops out and rejects all resale o↵ers in event E1, his payo↵ is therefore
Ud1 (0) = Pr{E2}T1(v1A, E2) + Pr{E3}T1(v1A, E3)
which implies that
T1(0)   Pr{E2}T1(v1A, E2) + Pr{E3}T1(v1A, E3) (2.5)
by incentive compatibility.
Since v2B 2 [0, 1] and   2 [0, 2], 0 < Pr{  < v2B} < 1. Consider a monotonically
decreasing sequence of v1A that converges to 0. Denote this sequence as {vn}. Let yn =
FL(vn) and zn = FG(b 1G (bL(vn))). Since FL is a continuous function and FL(0) = 0, the
sequence {yn} converges to 0. {bL(vn)} is a monotonically decreasing sequence because
bL is a strictly increasing function. Moreover, {bL(vn)} is bounded, so it converges to BL.
Then, {b 1G (bL(vn))} converges to 0 since BL = BG, so {zn} converges to 0. Therefore,
{yn + zn} converges to 0. Since Pr{  < v2B} > 0, there exists an integer N such that, for
all n   N, yn + zn < Pr{  < v2B}. Thus, there exists   2 (0, 1) such that
Pr{  < v2B} > FL(v1A) + FG(b 1G (bL(v1A)))
holds for all v1A 2 (0,  ). Therefore, for su ciently small v1A > 0, deviating to the
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strategy of bidder 1 with v1A = 0 is profitable because
U1(v1A)  Pr{E2}[v1A + T1(v1A, E2)] + Pr{E3}[v1A + T1(v1A, E3)]
 [Pr{E2} + Pr{E3}]v1A + T1(0)
 [FL(v1A) + FG(b 1G (bL(v1A)))]v1A + T1(0)
< Pr{  < v2B}v1A + T1(0)
= Ud1 (v1A).
where the second inequality holds by Inequality (2.5).
Therefore, there does not exist an equilibrium in which the bidders use strictly increasing
strategies in the auction stage.
In the proposition above, it is not essential that the bidders bid symmetrically according
to strictly increasing functions. The key part of the proof is that a bidder reveals his value by
dropping out of the auction. In the resale stage, the seller can then sell the object at the highest
price the potential buyer is willing to pay and the buyer gets 0 after resale. For some types of
bidders, it is profitable to deviate and bid in a way such that their private information remains
private so they are o↵ered resale prices that are lower than what they are willing to pay.
In the previous section, we show that resale may improve allocation e ciency in certain
situations when the losers have no private information. However, the above proposition shows
that it is di cult to achieve e ciency once the entire game is taken into consideration.
2.6 E ciency with weakly increasing strategies
In the previous section, we established that there exists no equilibrium in which the bidders
are using strictly increasing strategies. In this section, we study the problem with weakly
increasing strategies.
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Proposition 2.6.1 Let v1A and v2B be distributed continuously on [0, 1] according to FL and  
be distributed continuously on [0, 2] according to FG. Suppose all bidders use weakly increas-
ing strategies. Suppose b1A(x) = b2B(x) for all x and b3A( ) = b3B( ) for all  , where bi j(v)
is the price at which bidder i with value v drops out of the auction for object j when every
other bidder is still participating in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then there exists no
equilibrium in which the objects are allocated e ciently after the resale stage.
Proof Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which the post-resale allocation is e cient.
First, we note that e ciency requires that the local bidders use separating strategies when
all three bidders are participating in the auction. To see why this is the case, suppose the
contrary. Then, there exist v and v, where 0  v < v, such that b1A(v) = b1A(v0) for all
v, v0 2 [v, v]. Consider the event where v1A 2 [v, v], v2B 2 [v, v] and   2 (2v, 2v]. This is
an event that occurs with strictly positive probability because Pr{v1A 2 [v, v], v2B 2 [v, v],   2
(2v, 2v]} = [FL(v)   FL(v)]2[FG(2v)   FG(2v)] > 0.
In any e cient equilibrium of the game, bidder 3 cannot drop out of the auction before
he is sure that    v1A + v2B. Otherwise, bidders 1 and 2 win the objects in the auction
when the probability that   > v1A + v2B is strictly positive. By Proposition 2.4.2, there is
zero probability of resale in this case, so this equilibrium is ine cient with strictly positive
probability. Therefore, bidder 3 with   2 (2v, 2v] has to win both objects in the simultaneous
ascending auction against bidders 1 and 2 with v1A, v2B 2 [v, v].
Note that, with strictly positive probability, resale is necessary to achieve e ciency because
v1A + v2B >   with strictly positive probability in the event we are considering. Let p1 and p2
denote the o↵ers bidder 3 makes at the resale stage after winning both objects to bidders 1 and
2 respectively. Then, p1 + p2     because bidder 3 would be better o↵ keeping the objects
otherwise. Bidder 1 is willing to accept bidder 3’s o↵er p1 if and only if p1  v1A. Similarly,
bidder 2 is willing to accept bidder 3’s o↵er p2 if and only if p2  v2B. If bidder 3 sells only
one object, say object A, and keeps the other object, object B, then v1A   p1    . This is
ine cient because v2B > 0 with strictly positive probability; thus, v1A + v2B >   with strictly
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positive probability but object B is not assigned to bidder 2. On the other hand, if bidder 3 sells
both objects to the local bidders, then p1 + p2     implies that p1    2 or p2  
 
2
. Without
loss of generality, assume p1    2 . If p1   v, the resale of object A to bidder 1 occurs with zero
probability. However, v1A + v2B >   with strictly positive probability, so this is ine cient. If
p1 < v, first consider the point (v1A, v2B) =
✓ 
2
  ✏, v
◆
, where ✏ 2
✓
0,min
✓
v    
2
,
 
2
◆◆
.7 Then,
v1A + v2B =
 
2
  ✏ + v >  
2
 
✓
min
✓
v    
2
,
 
2
◆◆
+ v = max( , v)    .
Therefore, it is e cient for the local bidders to own the objects. However, there is no resale
in this case since bidder 1 is unwilling to buy object A because v1A <
 
2
 p1. Similarly,
we can find a neighbourhood of the point (v1A, v2B) =
✓ 
2
  ✏, v
◆
such that there is no resale
even when it is e cient for the local bidders to own the objects. In particular, the event {v1A 2
(v, p1)} \ {v1A + v2B >  } occurs with strictly positive probability. The upshot is that the
allocation after the resale stage is ine cient with strictly positive probability, contradicting the
assumption of e ciency. Therefore, in an e cient equilibrium, the local bidders have to use
separating strategies while all three bidders are participating in the auction.
Denote bidder 1’s equilibrium payo↵ conditional on v1A as U1(v1A). Then, for bidder 1 with
v1A = 0,
U1(0) = T1(0)   0
where T1(0) is the expected transfer conditional on v1A = 0. In addition, bidder 1 with v1A = 0
consumes object A with probability Pr{  < v2B} since the allocation in this equilibrium is
e cient. Therefore, if bidder 1 with v1A > 0 deviates to the strategy of bidder 1 with v1A = 0,
his payo↵ is
Ud1 (v1A) = Pr{  < v2B}v1A + T1(0).
Now consider v1A > 0. In equilibrium, each of the three bidders may drop out of the auction
7Since p1 < v and p1    2 , v  
 
2
> 0. Thus, ✏ is indeed well-defined. Then, v1A 2
✓
max(0,     v),  
2
◆
.
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first. Consider the following three events8 which are conditional on v1A:
1. Event E1: Bidder 1 drops out before bidders 2 and 3.
Bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 1’s value is revealed because the local bidders use
separating strategies. If bidder 3 does not o↵er object A for resale, bidder 1’s payo↵ is 0.
On the other hand, if bidder 3 o↵ers object A to bidder 1, the optimal price for bidder 3 is
v1A because that is the maximum price that bidder 1 is willing to pay. Therefore, bidder
1’s payo↵ is 0 regardless of whether or not bidder 3 resells object A.
2. Event E2: Bidder 2 drops out before bidders 1 and 3.
Bidder 2 reveals his value and bidder 3 wins object B. Since the local bidders are using
symmetric separating strategies, it must be the case that v2B < v1A. Therefore,
Pr{E2}  Pr{v2B < v1A|v1A} = FL(v1A). (2.6)
Moreover, bidder 1 has object A after the resale stage with probability Pr{v1A + v2B >
 |v1A, E2} since the allocation is e cient in this equilibrium. Denote bidder 1’s expected
transfer in this case as T1(v1A, E2).
3. Event E3: Bidder 3 drops out before bidders 1 and 2.
Suppose all three bidders are still participating in the simultaneous ascending auction.
Let the current price in the auction for each object be p. Since the local bidders use fully
separating strategies, bidder 3 knows that both the following inequalities must hold.
b1A(v1A)   p,
b2B(v2B)   p.
8We ignore cases where at least two bidders drop out simultaneously because the local bidders are using
separating strategies, so ties happen with zero probability.
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As explained earlier, in any e cient equilibrium of the game, bidder 3 cannot drop out
of the auction before he is sure that    v1A + v2B. Consequently, at each price p, bidder
3 can drop out of both auctions only if    2vˆ, where vˆ = inf{v : bL(v)   p}. Then,
Pr{E3}  Pr{   2v1A|v1A} = FG(2v1A). (2.7)
Moreover, if bidder 3 drops out of the simultaneous auction before bidders 1 and 2, there
is zero probability of resale by Proposition 2.4.2. So bidder 1 keeps object A and we
denote his expected transfer in this case as T1(v1A, E3).
Therefore, for bidder 1 with v1A > 0,
U1(v1A) = Pr{E1}(0) + Pr{E2}[Pr{v1A + v2B >  |v1A, E2}v1A + T1(v1A, E2)]
+Pr{E3}[v1A + T1(v1A, E3)]
 FL(v1A)[v1A + T1(v1A, E2)] + FG(2v1A)[v1A + T1(v1A, E3)].
If bidder 1 with v1A = 0 deviates and drops out of the auction at the price at which bidder 1
with v1A > 0 drops out but, in event E1, rejects all o↵ers at the resale stage, his payo↵ is
Ud1 (0) = Pr{E2}T1(v1A, E2) + Pr{E3}T1(v1A, E3).
Since
U1(0)   Ud1 (0)
by incentive compatibility,
T1(0)   Pr{E2}T1(v1A, E2) + Pr{E3}T1(v1A, E3). (2.8)
Finally, since v2B 2 [0, 1] and   2 [0, 2], Pr{  < v2B} > 0. In addition, FL and FG are
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continuous, FL(0) + FG(0) = 0 and FL(1) + FG(2) = 2. Therefore, by the intermediate value
theorem, there exists ↵ 2 (0, 1) such that
FL(v1A) + FG(2v1A) < Pr{  < v2B}
holds for all v1A 2 (0,↵). This implies that bidder 1 with su ciently small v1A has a profitable
deviation since
U1(v1A)  [Pr{E2} + Pr{E3}]v1A + T1(0)
 [FL(v1A) + FG(2v1A)]v1A + T1(0)
< Pr{  < v2B}v1A + T1(0)
= Ud1 (v1A)
where the first inequality follows from Inequality (2.8) and the second inequality follows from
Inequalities (2.6) and (2.7). This cannot be an equilibrium.
In the proposition above, it is not essential that the bidders bid symmetrically according to
weakly increasing functions. The key part of the proof is that, given the fixed resale mechanism,
bidders 1 and 2 are required to use separating strategies to achieve e ciency, but a bidder who
reveals his value by dropping out of the auction gets 0 after resale. For some types of bidders,
it is profitable to deviate and bid in such a way that their private information remains private so
they are o↵ered resale prices that are lower than what they are willing to pay.
2.7 Improvement of e ciency through resale
The previous two sections provide some indication of how di cult it is to achieve e ciency
when the entire game is considered. In this section, we describe an equilibrium where resale
improves e ciency relative to the benchmark equilibrium without resale. Let v1A and v2B be
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independently and identically distributed uniformly on [0, 1].
According to Proposition 1 in Zheng (2012), in the benchmark equilibrium without resale,
bidders 1 and 2 bid up to their values while bidder 3 bids according to the following:
• When the price is 0, he participates in the auctions for both objects.
• If both auctions are still going on, he bids up to pj =   + 1  
p
1 + 2    2 2
3
if   < 1
and pj =
2    1
3
if     1 for each object j.
• If he has won an object, he continues in the auction for the other object up to the price of
 .
Consider the following. Suppose the bidders bid according to the following in the simulta-
neous ascending auction.
• If the auctions for both objects are going on, 8i 2 {1, 2}, bidder i drops out at 0 if
vi j 2 [0, x) and bids up to bL > 0 if vi j 2 [x, 1]. Bidder 3 drops out of both auctions at bG,
where 0 < bG < bL; whereas he drops out from both auctions at M, where M > bL, if he
stayed in both auctions at price bG.
• If only one of the auctions is going on and the global bidder has won the other object, the
remaining local bidder drops out at c > 0 and the global bidder drops out at M, where
M > c.
• If only one of the auctions is going on and a local bidder has won the other object, the
remaining local bidder drops out at
1
4(1   x) and the global bidder drops out at M, where
M >
1
4(1   x) .
If a local bidder drops out of the auction at price 0, the global bidder believes that the local
bidder’s value for the object vi j is given by updated prior distribution conditional on vi j 2 [0, x).
Otherwise, the global bidder believes that the local bidder’s value for the object vi j is given by
updated prior distribution conditional on vi j 2 [x, 1].
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The simultaneous ascending auction is followed by the fixed resale mechanism defined above
that is optimal given the beliefs. Then, we claim that an equilibrium defined by {x, bL, bG, c,M}
exists. Furthermore, the following proposition proves that there exists such an equilibrium with
resale that improves e ciency relative to the benchmark equilibrium without resale.
Proposition 2.7.1 Let v1A and v2B be distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Let   be commonly
known. If   2 h1, 54⌘, then there exists an equilibrium where the bidders bid according to
the strategies prescribed above in the simultaneous ascending auction followed by the fixed
resale mechanism. This equilibrium weakly improves e ciency for every realization of values
relative to the benchmark equilibrium without resale. The probability of ine ciency is reduced
by 2
 
2    
9
!2
.
Proof An equilibrium defined by {x, bL, bG, c,M} such that
x =
2    1
3
,
bG =
37
54
    10
27
,
2 + 11 
24
= bL < c <
 22 2 + 40    1
24(2    ) and
M >
5
4
is an equilibrium with resale that improves e ciency relative to the benchmark equilibrium
without resale.
First, it is necessary to establish the resale prices in equilibrium in order to show that
{x, bL, bG, c,M} indeed defines an equilibrium. We need to consider the following cases.
1. Bidder 3 wins both objects in the simultaneous ascending auction. Let F1 be the updated
cumulative distribution function for v1A and F2 be the updated cumulative distribution
function for v2B. Let p1 be the resale price at which bidder 3 o↵ers object A to bidder 1
and p2 be the resale price at which bidder 3 o↵ers object B to bidder 2.
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(a) Bidder 3 believes that v1A 2 [0, x) and v2B 2 [0, x).
Since x =
2    1
3
and   2
"
1,
5
4
!
, x <
1
2
. Therefore, in this case, there is no resale
and bidder 3 consumes both objects.
(b) Bidder 3 believes that v1A 2 [0, x) and v2B 2 [x, 1].
In this case,
F1(v) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if v  0
v
x
if 0 < v < x
1 if v   x
and
F2(v) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if v  x
v   x
1   x if x < v < 1
1 if v   1
.
Since v2B = 1 with probability 0 and     1, there is zero probability that bidder 3 is
willing to resell to bidder 2 alone. Then, bidder 3 solves
max
p1,p2
[1   F1(p1)][1   F2(p2)](p1 + p2    ) +  .
Consider the first order conditions:
x   2p1   p2 +  
x
= 0
and
1   p1   2p2 +  
1   x = 0.
The optimal prices are
p1 =
  + 2x   1
3
(2.9)
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and
p2 =
2 +     x
3
. (2.10)
Since p1 < x and p2 < 1, resale takes place only if both bidders 1 and 2 accept
bidder 3’s o↵ers. The expected profit is
325 2   166  + 4
162(2    1)
which is higher than the expected profits given by the boundary solutions. There-
fore, the maximized expected profit is
⇡0,1( ) =
325 2   166  + 4
162(2    1) . (2.11)
(c) Bidder 3 believes that v1A 2 [x, 1] and v2B 2 [0, x).
This case is symmetric to case (b). Therefore, it is optimal for bidder 3 to o↵er
objects A and B at the resale prices
p1 =
2 +     x
3
(2.12)
and
p2 =
  + 2x   1
3
(2.13)
to bidders 1 and 2 respectively. Resale occurs only if both bidders 1 and 2 accept
bidder 3’s o↵ers. Therefore, the maximized expected profit is
⇡1,0( ) =
325 2   166  + 4
162(2    1) (2.14)
(d) Bidder 3 believes that v1A 2 [x, 1] and v2B 2 [x, 1].
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In this case,
Fi(v) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if v  x
v   x
1   x if x < v < 1
1 if v   1
for i 2 {1, 2}. Since v1A = 1 with probability 0, v2B = 1 with probability 0 and
    1, there is zero probability that bidder 3 is willing to resell to either bidder 1 or
bidder 2 alone. Then, bidder 3 solves
max
p1,p2
[1   F1(p1)][1   F2(p2)](p1 + p2    ) +  .
The first order conditions are
(1   p2)(1 +     2p1   p2)
(1   x)2 = 0
and
(1   p1)(1 +     2p2   p1)
(1   x)2 = 0
while the optimal prices are
pi =
1 +  
3
(2.15)
for i 2 {1, 2}. Since pi < 1, resale occurs only if both bidders 1 and 2 accept bidder
3’s o↵ers. The expected profit is
11
12
  +
1
6
which is higher than the expected profits
given by the boundary solutions. Therefore, the maximized expected profit is
⇡1,1( ) =
11
12
  +
1
6
.
2. Bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 2 wins object B in the simultaneous ascending auction.
Let F1 be the updated cumulative distribution function for v1A. Let p1 be the resale price
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at which bidder 3 o↵ers object A to bidder 1 and p3 be the resale price at which bidder 2
o↵ers object B to bidder 3.
(a) Bidders 2 and 3 believe that v1A 2 [0, x).
Then,
F1(v) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if v  0
v
x
if 0 < v < x
1 if v   x
.
If bidder 3 buys object B from bidder 2, his value for the package of objects A and
B is  . Since     1 and it is believed that v1A 2 [0, x), bidder 3 does not o↵er the
objects for resale. On the other hand, if bidder 3 does not buy object B from bidder
2, his value for object A alone is 0. Therefore, bidder 3 solves
max
p1
[1   F1(p1)]p1.
The first order condition is
1   2p1
x
= 0
while the optimal price is
p1 =
1
2
x. (2.16)
Therefore, bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is
1
4
x if he does not buy object B from bidder
2. Hence, the highest price bidder 3 is willing to pay for object B is     1
4
x.
Consequently, if v2B <     14 x, bidder 2 o↵ers object B to bidder 3 at the price
p3 =     14 x; (2.17)
otherwise, he consumes object B.
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(b) Bidders 2 and 3 believe that v1A 2 [x, 1].
Then,
F1(v) =
8>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if v  x
v   x
1   x if x < v < 1
1 if v   1
.
If bidder 3 buys object B from bidder 2, his value for the package of objects A and
B is  . Since     1 and it is believed that v1A 2 [x, 1], bidder 3 does not o↵er the
objects for resale. On the other hand, if bidder 3 does not buy object B from bidder
2, his value for object A alone is 0. Therefore, bidder 3 solves
max
p1
[1   F1(p1)]p1.
The first order condition is
1   2p1
1   x = 0
and, using the fact that x <
1
2
, the optimal price is
p1 =
1
2
.
Therefore, bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is
1
4(1   x) if he does not buy object B from
bidder 2. Hence the highest price bidder 3 is willing to pay for object B is    
1
4(1   x) . Consequently, bidder 2 o↵ers object B to bidder 3 at the price
p3 =     14(1   x)
if v2B <     14(1   x) and consumes object B otherwise.
3. Bidder 1 wins object A and bidder 3 wins object B in the simultaneous ascending auction.
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Let F2 be the updated cumulative distribution function for v2B. Let p2 be the resale price
at which bidder 3 o↵ers object B to bidder 2 and p3 be the resale price at which bidder 1
o↵ers object A to bidder 3.
(a) Bidders 1 and 3 believe that v2B 2 [0, x).
This case is symmetric to case 2(a). Therefore, if bidder 3 buys object A from
bidder 1, there is no resale of object B to bidder 2. Otherwise, bidder 3 o↵ers object
B to bidder 2 at the price
p2 =
1
2
x.
Bidder 1 o↵ers object A to bidder 3 at the price
p3 =     14 x
if v1A <     14 x and consumes object A otherwise.
(b) Bidders 1 and 3 believe that v2B 2 [x, 1].
This case is symmetric to case 2(b). Therefore, if bidder 3 buys object A from
bidder 1, bidder 3 does not o↵er the objects for resale. Otherwise, bidder 3 o↵ers
object B to bidder 2 at the price
p2 =
1
2
.
Bidder 1 o↵ers object A to bidder 3 at the price
p3 =     14(1   x)
if v1A <     14(1   x) and consumes object A otherwise.
4. Bidder 1 wins object A and bidder 2 wins object B in the simultaneous ascending auc-
tion. Since   is commonly known, there is zero probability of resale in equilibrium by
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Proposition 2.4.1.
Now we consider the entire game and show that the proposed strategies constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
(I) Consider a history such that bidder 2 has dropped out at price pB = 0, and thus the global
bidder has won object B, while the auction for object A is still going on and the current
price is pA   0. The case where the global bidder has won object A and the auction for
object B is still going on is symmetric.
Suppose pA 2 [0, c). The strategies prescribe that bidder 1 drop out when the price
reaches c and bidder 3 drop out at M.
If both bidders follow the prescribed strategies, then bidder 3 wins both auctions and
believes that v1A 2 [x, 1], v2B 2 [0, x). By case 1(c), bidder 3 o↵ers the objects for resale
at prices p1 for object A and p2 for object B, where p1 and p2 are defined by Equations
(2.12) and (2.13) respectively. Resale occurs if both bidders 1 and 2 agree to buy. If
p1  v1A and p2  v2B, both bidders 1 and 2 are willing to buy the objects from bidder 3.
Thus the payo↵ of bidder 1 is
max
(
0,
 
v1A   2 +     x3
!
Pr
(
v2B     + 2x   13 | v2B 2 [0, x)
))
and the payo↵ of bidder 3 is
⇡1,0( )   c.
If bidder 1 drops out at price p0A , c such that p
0
A 2 [pA,M] instead, then bidder 3 still
wins both objects; the beliefs and thus resale prices are una↵ected, so bidder 1’s payo↵
remains the same. If bidder 1 stays after the price goes above M instead, then bidder
1 wins object A. By case 3(a), the highest price at which bidder 3 is willing to pay for
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object A at the resale stage is p3 =     14 x. Thus the payo↵ of bidder 1 is
max
(
    1
4
x, v1A
)
  M
which is negative. Hence bidder 1 does not have profitable deviations.
If bidder 3 drops out at price p0A , M such that p
0
A   c instead, then bidder 3 still wins
object A and gets the same payo↵ as from following the prescribed strategy. If bidder
3 drops out at price p0A 2 [pA, c) instead, then bidder 1 wins object A. By case 3(a),
the highest price at which bidder 3 is willing to pay for object A at the resale stage is
p3 =     14 x. Thus the payo↵ of bidder 3 is
1
4
x. Since ⇡1,0( )   c > 14 x, bidder 3 does
not have profitable deviations.9
At histories where pA 2 [c,M], the strategies prescribe that bidder 1 drop out immedi-
ately and bidder 3 continue bidding until M. Verification that bidder 1 has no incentive to
deviate in this case is nearly identical to that above. Ties are broken in favour of bidder
3; thus bidder 3 is indi↵erent between dropping out and continuing until M.
(II) Consider a history such that bidder 2 has dropped out at price pB > 0, and thus the global
bidder has won object B, while the auction for object A is still going on and the current
price is pA   pB. The case where the global bidder has won object A and the auction for
object B is still going on is symmetric.
Suppose pA 2 [pB, c). The strategies prescribe that bidder 1 drop out at price c and bidder
3 continue bidding and drop out when the price reaches M.
If both bidders follow the prescribed strategies, then bidder 3 wins both auctions and
believes that v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1]. By case 1(d), bidder 3 o↵ers each object at pi, where pi
is defined by Equation (2.15). Resale occurs if both bidders 1 and 2 agree to buy. If
pi  v1A and pi  v2B, both bidders 1 and 2 are willing to buy the objects from bidder 3.
9⇡1,0( )   c > 325 2 166 +4162(2  1)    22 
2+40  1
24(2  ) =
112 3 510 2+210  5
648(  2)(2  1) >
1
4 x.
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Thus the payo↵ of bidder 1 is
max
(
0,
 
v1A   1 +  3
!
Pr
(
v2B   1 +  3 | v2B 2 [x, 1]
))
and the payo↵ of bidder 3 is
⇡1,1( )   c   pB.
If bidder 1 drops out at price p0A , c such that p
0
A 2 [pA,M] instead, then bidder 3 still
wins both objects; the beliefs and thus resale prices are una↵ected, so bidder 1’s payo↵
remains the same. If bidder 1 stays after the price goes above M instead, then bidder
1 wins object A. By case 3(b), the highest price at which bidder 3 is willing to pay for
object A at the resale stage is p3 =     14(1   x) . Thus the payo↵ of bidder 1 is
max
(
    1
4(1   x) , v1A
)
  M
which is negative. Hence bidder 1 does not have profitable deviations.
If bidder 3 drops out at price p0A , M such that p
0
A   c instead, then bidder 3 still wins
object A and gets the same payo↵ as from following the prescribed strategy. If bidder 3
drops out at price p0A 2 [pA, c) instead, then bidder 1 wins object A. By case 3(b), the
highest price at which bidder 3 is willing to pay for object A at the resale stage is p3 =
    1
4(1   x) . Thus the payo↵ of bidder 3 is
1
4(1   x)   pB. Since ⇡1,1( )   c >
1
4(1   x) ,
bidder 3 does not have profitable deviations.10
At histories where pA 2 [c,M], the strategies prescribe that bidder 1 drop out immedi-
ately and bidder 3 continue bidding until M. Verification that bidder 1 has no incentive to
deviate in this case is nearly identical to that above. Ties are broken in favour of bidder
3; thus bidder 3 is indi↵erent between dropping out and continuing until M.
10⇡1,1( )   c > 1112  + 16    22 
2+40  1
24(2  ) =
3
8(2  ) =
1
4(1 x) .
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(III) Consider a history such that the global bidder has dropped out at price pB > 0, and bidder
2 has won object B, while the auction for object A is still going on and the current price
is pA   pB. The case where bidder 1 has won object A and the auction for object B is
still going on is symmetric.
Suppose pA 2
"
pB,
1
4(1   x)
!
. The strategies prescribe that bidder 1 drop out at price
1
4(1   x) and bidder 3 continue bidding and drop out when the price reaches M.
If both bidders follow the prescribed strategies, then bidder 3 wins object A at price
1
4(1   x) ; bidder 3 believes that v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1]. By case 2(b), bidder 3 o↵ers object A
at the price p1 =
1
2
if he does not buy object B from bidder 2; bidder 2 o↵ers object B
to bidder 3 at the price p3 =     14(1   x) if v2B <    
1
4(1   x) and consumes object B
otherwise. The payo↵ of bidder 1 is
max
(
0,
 
v1A   12
!
Pr
(
    1
4(1   x)  v2B  1 | v2B 2 [x, 1]
))
and the expected payo↵ of bidder 3 is zero.
If bidder 1 drops out at price p0A , c such that p
0
A 2 [pA,M] instead, then bidder 3 still
wins both objects; the beliefs and thus resale prices are una↵ected, so bidder 1’s payo↵
remains the same. If bidder 1 stays after the price goes above M instead, then bidder 1
wins object A. By case 4, there is zero probability of resale. The payo↵ of bidder 1 is
v1A   M
which is negative. Hence bidder 1 does not have profitable deviations.
If bidder 3 drops out at price p0A , M such that p
0
A   14(1   x) instead, then bidder 3
still wins object A and gets the same payo↵ as from following the prescribed strategy.
If bidder 3 drops out at price p0A 2
"
pA,
1
4(1   x)
!
instead, then bidder 1 wins object A.
44 Chapter 2. Simultaneous ascending auction with resale
By case 4, there is zero probability of resale, and the payo↵ of bidder 3 is zero. Hence
bidder 3 does not have profitable deviations.
Suppose pA 2
"
1
4(1   x) ,M
#
. The strategies prescribe that bidder 1 drop out immediately
and bidder 3 continue bidding until M. The expected payo↵ of bidder 1 is the same as
above and the expected payo↵ of bidder 3 is
1
4(1   x)   pA  0. Verification that bidder
1 has no incentive to deviate in this case is nearly identical to that above. Ties are broken
in favour of bidder 3; thus bidder 3 is indi↵erent between dropping out and continuing
until M.
(IV) Consider a history such that both auctions are still going on and the current prices are
p = 0. The strategies prescribe that, for i 2 {1, 2}, bidder i drop out immediately if
vi j 2 [0, x) and continue until bL if vi j 2 [x, 1], and bidder 3 continue bidding and drop
out when the price reaches bG.
Suppose all bidders follow the prescribed strategies. If v1A, v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3
wins both objects at price 0 and, by case 1(a), there is no resale. If v1A 2 [x, 1] and
v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3 wins object B at price 0, and the continuation game between
bidders 1 and 3 was previously analyzed in I. The case where v1A 2 [0, x) and v2B 2 [x, 1]
is symmetric. If v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1], then bidders 1 and 2 win objects A and B respectively
at price bG and, by case 4, there is no resale.
For bidder 1 with v1A 2 [0, x), the expected payo↵ is
max
(
0,
 
v1A     + 2x   13
!
Pr
(
v2B   2 +     x3
))
(2.18)
and, for bidder 1 with v1A 2 [x, 1], the expected payo↵ is
Pr
(
  + 2x   1
3
 v2B < x
)
max
(
0, v1A   2 +     x3
)
+ Pr {x  v2B  1} (v1A   bG).
(2.19)
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For bidder 3, the expected payo↵ is
Pr{v1A 2 [0, x), v2B 2 [0, x)}  + Pr{v1A 2 [0, x), v2B 2 [x, 1]}[⇡0,1( )   c]
+ Pr{v1A 2 [x, 1], v2B 2 [0, x)}[⇡1,0( )   c] + Pr{v1A 2 [x, 1], v2B 2 [x, 1]}(0). (2.20)
Now let us consider various deviations for the bidders. We have previously shown that
the prescribed strategies are sequentially rational for the bidders in cases when only one
of the auctions is still going on. Thus for each bidder we will consider all alternative
drop out prices provided that both auctions are still going on; if only one of the auctions
is still going on, we will take it that the bidders are following the prescribed strategies.
First, let us consider “on path” deviations, i.e. when a given type of the local bidder
mimics the behaviour of another type. Note that x and bG are defined to ensure that
bidder 1 of type v1A = x is indi↵erent between following the strategy prescribed for
types in [0, x) and for types in [x, 1]:
 
x     + 2x   1
3
!
Pr
(
v2B   2 +     x3
)
= Pr {x  v2B  1} (x   bG).
Also, note that the expected payo↵ of bidder 1 is non-decreasing in v1A. Thus no type of
the local bidder has an incentive to mimic the behaviour of another type.
Next, suppose bidder 1 drops out at p0 2 (0, bG). If v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3 wins object
B at price 0, and the continuation game was previously analyzed in I. If v2B 2 [x, 1], then
bidder 3 wins object A at price p0, and the continuation game was previously analyzed in
II, with the roles of bidders 1 and 2 being switched. The expected payo↵ of bidder 1 of
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type v1A is then
Pr
(
  + 2x   1
3
 v2B < x
)
max
(
0, v1A   2 +     x3
)
+ Pr
(
v2B   1 +  3
)
max
(
0, v1A   1 +  3
)
. (2.21)
Since Expression (2.21) is equal to Expression (2.18) for 0  v1A  p⇤ where p⇤ is
defined by Equation (2.9), Expression (2.21) is strictly less than Expression (2.18) for
p⇤ < v1A  x, and Expression (2.21) is strictly less than Expression (2.19) for x < v1A 
1, this is not a profitable deviation.
Next, suppose bidder 1 drops out at p0 = bG instead. If v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3
wins object B at price 0, and the continuation game was previously analyzed in I. If
v2B 2 [x, 1], then bidder 3 wins object A at price bG and bidder 2 wins object B at price
bG. By case 2(b), bidder 3 o↵ers object A at the price p1 =
1
2
if he does not buy object
B from bidder 2; bidder 2 o↵ers object B to bidder 3 at price p3 =     14(1   x) if
v2B <     14(1   x) and consumes object B otherwise. The payo↵ of bidder 1 of type v1A
is then
Pr
(
  + 2x   1
3
 v2B < x
)
max
(
0, v1A   2 +     x3
)
+ Pr
(
    1
4(1   x)  v2B  1
)
max
(
0, v1A   12
)
. (2.22)
Since Expression (2.22) is equal to Expression (2.18) for 0  v1A  p⇤ where p⇤ is
defined by Equation (2.9), Expression (2.22) is strictly less than Expression (2.18) for
p⇤ < v1A  x, and Expression (2.22) is strictly less than Expression (2.19) for x < v1A 
1, this is not a profitable deviation.
Finally, suppose bidder 1 drops out at p0 , bL such that p0 > bG instead. The expected
payo↵ of bidder 1 remains the same as if he dropped out at bL, as prescribed for types in
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[x, 1]. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Suppose bidder 3 simultaneously drops out from both auctions at p0 = 0. If v1A, v2B 2
[0, x), then bidder 3 wins both objects at price 0 and, by case 1(a), there is no resale. If
v1A 2 [x, 1] and v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3 loses object A and wins object B at price 0. By
case 3(a), bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is
1
4
x. The case where v1A 2 [0, x) and v2B 2 [x, 1]
is symmetric. If v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1], then bidders 1 and 2 win objects A and B at price 0; by
case 4, there is no resale. The expected payo↵ of bidder 3 is
Pr{v1A 2 [0, x), v2B 2 [0, x)}  + Pr{v1A 2 [0, x), v2B 2 [x, 1]}14 x
+ Pr{v1A 2 [x, 1], v2B 2 [0, x)}14 x + Pr{v1A 2 [x, 1], v2B 2 [x, 1]}(0). (2.23)
Since ⇡0,1( )   c > 14 x and ⇡0,1( )   c >
1
4
x, Expression (2.23) is strictly less than
Expression (2.20), so this is not a profitable deviation.
Next, suppose bidder 3 drops out from both auctions at p0 2 (0, bL). This results in the
same outcome and payo↵s as when all bidders follow their equilibrium strategies. Hence
this is not a profitable deviation.
Next, suppose bidder 3 plans to stay in both auctions until the price reaches p0 2 [0, bL),
and then drop out from the auction for object B only. If v1A, v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder
3 wins both objects at price 0 and, by case 1(a), there is no resale. If v1A 2 [x, 1] and
v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3 wins object B at price 0; the continuation game between
bidders 1 and 3 was previously analyzed in I. The case where v1A 2 [0, x) and v2B 2 [x, 1]
is symmetric. If v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1], then bidder 2 wins object B at price p0; the continuation
game between bidders 1 and 3 was previously analyzed in III, and bidder 3’s expected
payo↵ in it is zero. Therefore, bidder 3’s expected payo↵ from this deviation is identical
to the equilibrium expected payo↵. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Finally, suppose bidder 3 drops out from both auctions at prices that are at least bL. If v1A,
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v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3 wins both objects at price 0 and, by case 1(a), there is no resale.
If v1A 2 [x, 1] and v2B 2 [0, x), then bidder 3 wins object B at price 0; the continuation
game was previously analyzed in I. The case where v1A 2 [0, x) and v2B 2 [x, 1] is
symmetric. Finally, if v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1], bidders 1 and 2 drop out simultaneously when the
price is bL. By case 1(d), bidder 3 o↵ers objects A and B to bidders 1 and 2 at the same
price pi =
1 +  
3
. Resale occurs only if both bidders 1 and 2 accept bidder 3’s o↵ers;
bidder 3 expects to get ⇡1,1( )  2bL = 0. Therefore, bidder 3’s expected payo↵ from this
deviation is identical to the equilibrium expected payo↵. Hence this is not a profitable
deviation.
Next, consider a history such that both auctions are still going on and the current prices
are p 2 (0, bG]. Bidder 3 believes that v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1]. The strategies prescribe that
bidders 1 and 2 continue until bL and bidder 3 continue bidding and drop out when the
price reaches bG.
Suppose all bidders follow the prescribed strategies. Then bidders 1 and 2 win objects A
and B at price bG and, by case 4, there is no resale. For bidder 1 with v1A 2 [x, 1], the
expected payo↵ is v1A   bG; for bidder 3, the expected payo↵ is zero.
Suppose bidder 1 drops out at p0 2 (p, bG). Bidder 3 wins object A at price p0; the
continuation game was previously analyzed in II, with the roles of bidders 1 and 2 being
switched. The expected payo↵ of bidder 1 of type v1A is then
max
(
0,
 
v1A   1 +  3
!
Pr
(
v2B   1 +  3
))
which is less than v1A   bG since bG < 1 +  3 . Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Next, suppose bidder 1 drops out at p0 = bG instead. Bidder 3 wins object A at price bG
and bidder 2 wins object B at price bG. By case 2(b), bidder 3 o↵ers object A at the price
p1 =
1
2
if he does not buy object B from bidder 2; bidder 2 o↵ers object B to bidder 3 at
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the price p3 =     14(1    ) if v2B <    
1
4(1   x) and consumes object B otherwise. The
payo↵ of bidder 1 of type v1A is then
max
(
0,
 
v1A   12
!
Pr
(
    1
4(1   x)  v2B  1
))
which is less than v1A   bG since bG < 12. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Finally, suppose bidder 1 drops out at p0 , bL such that p0 > bG instead. The expected
payo↵ of bidder 1 remains the same as if he drops out at bL, as prescribed for types in
[x, 1]. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Suppose bidder 3 drops out from both auctions at p0 2 [p, bL). This results in the same
outcome and payo↵s as when all bidders follow their equilibrium strategies. Hence this
is not a profitable deviation.
Next, suppose bidder 3 plans to stay in both auctions until the price reaches p0 2 [p, bL)
and then drop out from the auction for object B only. Bidder 2 wins object B at price
p0. The continuation game between bidders 1 and 3 was previously analyzed in III, and
bidder 3’s expected payo↵ in it is zero. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Finally, suppose bidder 3 drops out from both auctions at prices that are at least bL.
Bidders 1 and 2 drop out simultaneously when the price is bL. By case 1(d), bidder 3
o↵ers objects A and B to bidders 1 and 2 at the same price pi =
1 +  
3
. Resale occurs only
if both bidders 1 and 2 accept bidder 3’s o↵ers; bidder 3 expects to get ⇡1,1( )  2bL = 0.
Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Next, consider a history such that both auctions are still going on and the current prices
are p 2 (bG, bL]. Bidder 3 believes that v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1]. The strategies prescribe that
bidders 1 and 2 drop out at bL while bidder 3 is supposed to continue bidding and drop
out when the price reaches M.
Suppose all bidders follow the prescribed strategies. Bidder 3 wins both objects and
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o↵ers objects A and B to bidders 1 and 2 at the same price pi =
1 +  
3
; resale occurs only
if both bidders 1 and 2 accept bidder 3’s o↵ers. For bidder 1, the expected payo↵ is
max
(
0,
 
v1A   1 +  3
!
Pr
(
v2B   1 +  3
))
and bidder 3 expects to get
⇡1,1( )   2pi
which is non-negative since pi  bL = 12⇡1,1( ).
Suppose bidder 1 drops out at p0 2 [p, bL). Bidder 3 wins object A at price p0, and the
continuation game was previously analyzed in II, with the roles of bidders 1 and 2 being
switched. As a result, bidder 3 wins both objects and o↵ers objects A and B to bidders
1 and 2 at the same price pi =
1 +  
3
. This results in the same outcome and payo↵
for bidder 1 as when all bidders follow their equilibrium strategies. Hence this is not a
profitable deviation.
Finally, suppose bidder 1 plans to drop out at p0 > bL instead. Bidder 3 wins object B
at price bL, and the continuation game was previously analyzed in II. As a result, bidder
3 wins both objects and o↵ers objects A and B to bidders 1 and 2 at the same price
pi =
1 +  
3
. This results in the same outcome and payo↵ for bidder 1 as when all bidders
follow their equilibrium strategies. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Suppose bidder 3 drops out from both auctions at p0 2 [p, bL). Bidders 1 and 2 win
objects A and B at price p0 and, by case 4, there is no resale. The expected payo↵ of
bidder 3 is zero. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Next, suppose bidder 3 plans to stay in both auctions until the price reaches p0 2 [p, bL),
and then drop out from the auction for object B only. Bidder 2 wins object B at price p0.
The continuation game between bidders 1 and 3 was previously analyzed in III; bidder
3’s expected payo↵ in it is zero. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
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Finally, suppose bidder 3 drops out from both auctions at prices that are at least bL.
Bidders 1 and 2 drop out simultaneously when the price is bL. By case 1(d), bidder 3
o↵ers objects A and B to bidders 1 and 2 at the same price pi =
1 +  
3
. Resale occurs only
if both bidders 1 and 2 accept bidder 3’s o↵ers; bidder 3 expects to get ⇡1,1( )  2bL = 0.
Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Finally, consider a history such that both auctions are still going on and the current prices
are p > bL. Bidder 3 believes that v1A, v2B 2 [x, 1]. The strategies prescribe that bidders
1 and 2 drop out immediately; bidder 3 is supposed to continue bidding and drop out
when the price reaches M.
Suppose all bidders follow the prescribed strategies. Bidder 3 wins both objects and
o↵ers objects A and B to bidders 1 and 2 at the same price pi =
1 +  
3
; resale occurs only
if both bidders 1 and 2 accept bidder 3’s o↵ers. For bidder 1, the expected payo↵ is
max
(
0,
 
v1A   1 +  3
!
Pr
(
v2B   1 +  3
))
and bidder 3 expects to get
⇡1,1( )   2pi.
Suppose bidder 1 plans to drop out at p0 > p instead. Bidder 3 wins object B at price
p, and the continuation game was previously analyzed in II. As a result, bidder 3 wins
both objects and o↵ers objects A and B to bidders 1 and 2 at the same price pi =
1 +  
3
.
This results in the same outcome and payo↵ for bidder 1 as when all bidders follow their
equilibrium strategies. Hence this is not a profitable deviation.
Ties are broken in favour of bidder 3; thus bidder 3 is indi↵erent between dropping out
immediately and continuing until M.
It remains to show that the allocation e ciency in this equilibrium with resale is higher
than the allocation e ciency in the equilibrium without resale described in Proposition 1 of
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Zheng (2012). In this equilibrium with resale, the allocation of the objects immediately after
the simultaneous ascending auction ends and before the resale stage begins is exactly the same
as the allocation of the objects in the equilibrium without resale. In particular, the objects are
allocated in the following way:
• If v1A > x and v2B > x, bidder 1 has object A and bidder 2 has object B.
• Otherwise, bidder 3 has both objects.
In the case where v1A < x and v2B > x, by case 1(b), it is optimal for bidder 3 to o↵er the
objects to bidders 1 and 2 at the prices p1 and p2, where p1 and p2 are defined by Equations
(2.9) and (2.10) respectively, and sell both objects only if both bidders 1 and 2 accept the resale
o↵ers. Since p1 < x and p2 < 1, resale occurs with probability
Pr{p1  v1A  x}Pr{p2  v2B  1} =
 
1 + x    
3
!2
=
 
2    
9
!2
which is strictly positive since   2
"
1,
5
4
!
. The e ciency of the allocation is improved because,
when resale occurs,
  < p1 + p2  v1A + v2B. (2.24)
The first inequality in Expression (2.24) holds because
  <
5
4
=)   < 2 =)   < 8  + 2
9
=
  + 2x   1
3
+
2 +     x
3
= p1 + p2.
The second inequality in Expression (2.24) holds because each of bidders 1 and 2 is willing
to buy an object from bidder 3 in the resale stage only if the resale price does not exceed his
value, and bidder 3 is willing to sell the objects only if both bidders 1 and 2 are willing to buy
the objects.
Similarly, in the case where v1A > x and v2B < x, the e ciency of the allocation is improved
through resale. Therefore, the allocation e ciency of the equilibrium with resale is higher than
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the allocation e ciency of the equilibrium without resale.
The proposition above shows that, under some conditions, resale can indeed improve al-
location e ciency. This result is driven by the fact that the equilibrium value of x coincides
precisely with the global bidder’s strategy in the game without resale. Now, we provide an
illustrative example for the case where   = 1. Then, as shown in Figure 2.1, it is e cient for
bidders 1 and 2 to own the objects whenever v1A + v2B > 1 and for bidder 3 to own the objects
otherwise. When the objects are allocated e ciently, the surplus is
7
6
.
v1A + v2B = 1
v1A
v2B
0
1
1
Bidder 1 has A; bidder 2 has B.
Bidder 3 has A and B.
Figure 2.1: E cient allocation of the objects for   = 1.
In the benchmark equilibrium without resale, bidders 1 and 2 bid up to their values. If both
auctions are going on, bidder 3 bids up to pj =
1
3
for each object j; if he has already won an
object, he bids up to 1 for the other object. The object allocation after the auction is shown in
Figure 2.2. The surplus is
31
27
.
In the equilibrium defined in the proposition above, the allocation of the objects after the
simultaneous ascending auction is the same as in the benchmark equilibrium without resale.
As shown in Figure 2.3, at the resale stage, some resale takes place when bidder 3 wins both
objects. In particular, when bidder 3 believes that v1A 2 [0, x] and v2B 2 [x, 1], he o↵ers object
A to bidder 1 at the price p1 =
2
9
and o↵ers object B to bidder 2 at the price p2 =
8
9
. Similarly,
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v1A
v2B
0
1
113
1
3
Bidder 1 has A; bidder 2 has B.
Bidder 3 has A and B.
Bidder 3 has A and B.
Figure 2.2: Allocation of the objects in the benchmark equilibrium without resale.
v1A
v2B
0
1
113
1
3
Bidder 1 has A; bidder 2 has B.
Bidder 3 has A and B.
Bidder 3 has A and B.
Bidder 3 sells the objects to bidders 1 and 2.
Bidder 3 sells the objects to bidders 1 and 2.
Figure 2.3: Allocation of the objects in the equilibrium with resale. As indicated in red, there
is resale in some cases.
when bidder 3 believes that v1A 2 [x, 1] and v2B 2 [0, x], he o↵ers object A to bidder 1 at the
price p1 =
8
9
and o↵ers object B to bidder 2 at the price p2 =
2
9
. Resale occurs if both bidders
1 and 2 accept the o↵ers. The extra surplus from resale is
4
729
, so resale through the fixed
mechanism closes approximately 30% of the e ciency gap.
In particular, the example above shows that resale takes place when bidder 3 wins both
objects ine ciently but not when bidders 1 and 2 win the objects ine ciently. Therefore, the
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fixed resale mechanism corrects overconcentration but not overdi↵usion. This feature may
be due to the fact that, when the objects are “overly di↵used” to the local bidders, the local
bidders make separate take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers to the global bidder and at least one of the sellers
demands the entire share of the global bidder’s value for the package of objects. Therefore, a
resale mechanism that does not allow at least one of the sellers to demand the entire share of
the global bidder’s value for the package of objects may be able to correct overdi↵usion. One
example of such a resale mechanism is one that allows the buyers to make take-it-or-leave-it
o↵ers to the sellers instead. Alternatively, resale mechanisms that give all the bargaining power
to the global bidder at the resale stage, even if the global bidder does not win both objects in
the auction, might improve e ciency as well.
More generally, the example above shows that, although the fixed resale mechanism can
improve allocation e ciency under some conditions, it cannot restore full e ciency. This may
be because the bidders have private information about their own values after the auction; resale
does not always occur whenever resale is necessary to restore e ciency. This is not unique to
the model studied in this paper. Therefore, the impossibility of e ciency may extend to other
models with resale.
2.8 Conclusion
The simultaneous ascending auction is a standard method to sell multiple heterogeneous ob-
jects. Although secondary markets cannot be banned, the economics literature has little to say
about simultaneous ascending auctions with resale. This paper is an attempt to investigate the
e↵ects of resale on the allocation e ciency of the simultaneous ascending auction.
By studying a model with two objects and three bidders, we find that there is no equilibrium
in which the simultaneous ascending auction allocates the objects e ciently. This result holds
with or without resale and this result is independent of the resale mechanism.
One of the bidders in the model is a global bidder for whom the exposure problem is a
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concern. Given our fixed resale mechanism, resale can only partially mitigate the exposure
problem for the global bidder because resale does not take place when the objects are overly
di↵used to the local bidders after the auction but it is possible for the global bidder to resell the
objects when the objects are overly concentrated in his hands.
Resale a↵ects how the bidders behave in the auction. When the possibility of resale exists,
the bidders anticipate resale and bid accordingly during the auction. Given our fixed resale
mechanism, under some conditions, equilibria in which the bidders use fully separating strate-
gies in the auction do not exist. This result could be driven by the fact that a loser in the
auction gets a payo↵ of 0 after the resale stage because his value has been revealed in the auc-
tion. While information revelation can improve allocation e ciency, it is detrimental to the
losers who may otherwise get positive payo↵s.
Consequently, the improvement of e ciency that occurs in the resale stage after the losers
reveal their information during the auction may be more di cult to achieve because it may still
be uncertain after the auction whether resale should take place and, if resale should take place,
what prices should be o↵ered in order to ensure an e cient outcome.
Are there resale mechanisms that would result in fully e cient allocation? We study this
problem using a mechanism design approach in a related paper.
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Chapter 3
Speculators in simultaneous ascending
auctions
3.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the e↵ects of resale on a simultaneous ascending auction. A simulta-
neous ascending auction is an auction format that allows a seller of multiple heterogeneous
objects to sell these objects simultaneously, yet separately. Each object is auctioned via an
English auction; these English auctions are held simultaneously. Although there is only one
seller, there is no coordination across the separate English auctions. This auction format was
first adopted by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1994 to sell electro-
magnetic spectrum licences. Since then, the simultaneous ascending auction has become one
of the standard methods to conduct spectrum auctions in the US and around the world.
Since resale of spectrum licences has occurred1 and bans on post-auction trade are di -
cult to enforce,2 there may be speculators in the auctions who do not value the licences but
hope to make a profit by reselling the licences won in the auctions to other bidders. Garratt
and Tro¨ger (2006) investigate how a speculator a↵ects standard auctions with resale. In first-
1See Cramton (2004).
2See Hafalir and Krishna (2009).
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price and Dutch auctions with resale, they conclude that speculators do not profit and that the
opportunity to resell the good after the auction can be detrimental to e ciency. However, in
second-price and English auctions, there are multiple equilibria: the e cient equilibrium in
which bidders bid their values exists, along with ine cient equilibria in which the speculator
wins the auction and makes a positive profit from resale. In uniform-price auctions with com-
plete information and resale, Pagnozzi (2010) finds that bidders with high values may strictly
prefer to let speculators win in the auction so that they can acquire some units at lower prices
at the auctions. Garratt, Tro¨ger, and Zheng (2009) construct a family of equilibria in which
one designated bidder wins the good without any competition; the winner then chooses an ar-
bitrary resale mechanism to divide the spoils from collusion among members of the bidding
ring. Even a high-value bidder prefers collusion to value-bidding in the auction. Rather than
mitigating ine ciency, the possibility of resale creates ine ciency in these equilibria because
the e ciency is lower than the e ciency of the value-bidding equilibrium.
In such an auction with multiple objects, there may be bidders who value the objects as
well. These bidders may be local bidders or global bidders. A local bidder values only one
particular object, whereas a global bidder’s payo↵ from winning his desired bundle of related
objects is higher than the sum of the standalone values for the objects if those objects are
complementary. This synergy may arise due to various reasons. Although complementarities
between objects can give a global bidder a boost in payo↵, they also create a dilemma for him.
In a simultaneous ascending auction, when the price of an object is above its standalone value
and the prices of the other objects in a global bidder’s desired bundle are still uncertain, should
he continue bidding or drop out? If he is an aggressive competitor and continues to bid in the
auction, the complementary objects may turn out to be so expensive that he ends up getting
a negative payo↵ from acquiring his desired bundle. However, if he chooses to be cautious
and drops out now, he loses the opportunity to possibly acquire his desired bundle at a total
price that gives him a positive payo↵. The upshot of this is that the auction’s e ciency may
be adversely a↵ected. This problem that each global bidder faces is known as the exposure
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problem.
Xu, Levin, and Ye (2012) study auctions with synergy and resale. In their model, there
are two objects and two global bidders. The two objects are sold sequentially via second-price
sealed bid auctions; each bidder only learns his value for the second object being auctioned
after the first auction. After the two auctions, they consider two fixed resale mechanisms
(monopoly and monopsony take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers). They find that the resale mechanism has
an impact on bidding strategies in the auctions. When the resale mechanism is a monopsony
take-it-or-leave-it o↵er, resale always improves e ciency.
Filiz-Ozbay, Lopez-Vargas, and Ozbay (2015) use experiments to study multiple-object
auctions with resale with multiple local bidders and a global bidder with private information.
They consider two cases: a generalized Vickrey auction that allows package bidding followed
by resale and simultaneous second-price auctions followed by resale. In both cases, they fix
the resale mechanism (take-it-or-leave-it o↵ers made by the winners). A generalized Vickrey
auction followed by resale can allocate the objects e ciently at the auction stage. However,
when the objects are auctioned via simultaneous second-price sealed bid auctions, the final
allocation is ine cient even after post-auction trade.
In the previous chapter, we study the problem with local bidders and a global bidder who
participate in a simultaneous ascending auction. We do not allow speculators in the auction
and fix the resale mechanism. We find that resale does not completely mitigate the exposure
problem for the global bidder because resale never takes place whenever the global bidder loses
both objects ine ciently. However, the global bidder can resell the objects to the other bidders
whenever he wins both objects ine ciently.
In this paper, we study the problem with the same bidders who participate in a simultaneous
ascending auction. In contrast with the previous chapter, we allow speculators in the auction
and look for e cient resale mechanisms rather than using a fixed resale mechanism. Williams
(1999) extends the Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) bargaining problem to a multilateral
setting; we use this extension to find the appropriate resale mechanism. In some cases, even
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though the simultaneous ascending auction may grossly misallocate the objects by having the
speculators win the objects, there exist e cient resale mechanisms that can rectify the situation
and result in e cient outcomes.
3.2 Model
There are two objects that are denoted by A and B. There are two categories of bidders: local
bidders who value only one object and global bidders for whom the two objects are comple-
ments. There are three bidders: 1, 2 and 3. Bidder 1 values only object A and bidder 2 values
only object B. Their values for the objects, denoted by v1A and v2B respectively, are indepen-
dently and identically distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. Bidders 1 and 2 are allowed to bid for the
objects that they don’t value as well, so they are speculators in the auctions for those objects.
These speculators are players in the game, just like bidder 3 who is a global bidder. Bidder
3’s standalone value for each object is 0. His value for the package of both objects,  , is dis-
tributed uniformly on [0, 2]. The values v1A, v2B and   are private information; everything else
is commonly known. In addition, there is another player called the “social planner” whose role
is to o↵er resale mechanisms to the bidders to maximize e ciency. Since the social planner is
a player, he knows the prior beliefs.
The simultaneous ascending auction is modelled as in Zheng (2012). The two objects are
auctioned via separate English auctions which start simultaneously. Each English auction is
modelled by the “clock model” as in Albano, Germano, and Lovo (2001). In the separate
English auctions, the prices pA and pB start at 0 and increase at the same exogenous speed.
When a bidder drops out from an auction for a given object, the clock temporarily stops in
both auctions, and all bidders have a chance to exit at the same price. Ties are broken in favour
of a speculator (specifically, bidder 2 in the auction for object A and bidder 1 in the auction
for object B). If the speculator is not involved, then ties are broken in favour of bidder 3 (the
global bidder). The tie-breaking rule is crucial to the equilibrium construction because the
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feature that the speculators own the objects at the resale stage helps to relax the participation
constraints of the bidders at the resale process as much as possible since the speculators have
no use value for the objects they have won in the auction. When there is only one bidder left
in the auction for object j, where j 2 {A, B}, the object is then sold to the remaining bidder
at the current price. The bidders’ actions during the separate English auctions are commonly
observed. Consequently, at the end of the simultaneous ascending auction, each bidder knows
the identities of the winners and the prices paid by these winners to the auctioneer. In addition,
in equilibrium, the social planner knows the bidders’ strategies in the auction and observes the
outcome of the auction.
We use a refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept in this paper.
We consider pure strategies only. In the auction stage, each bidder decides the prices at which
he should drop out of the English auctions. In each resale subgame, there may be multiple
equilibria; the chosen equilibrium is the one that maximizes the expected social surplus.
After the simultaneous ascending auction, the social planner updates his beliefs and o↵ers a
resale mechanism that maximizes e ciency for the given beliefs, subject to interim individual
rationality and incentive compatible constraints. In addition, the resale mechanism is assumed
to be budget balanced. More details on the resale mechanism will be provided below.
Each bidder’s payo↵ is equal to his value of the object(s) he eventually owns minus his
total payment plus what he gets from participating in the resale mechanism.
3.3 Resale mechanisms
Since each bidder is allowed to bid for both objects, there are nine possible allocations after
the simultaneous ascending auction.
1. Bidder 1 has both objects A and B.
2. Bidder 1 has object A; bidder 2 has object B.
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3. Bidder 1 has object A; bidder 3 has object B.
4. Bidder 2 has object A; bidder 1 has object B.
5. Bidder 2 has both objects A and B.
6. Bidder 2 has object A; bidder 3 has object B.
7. Bidder 3 has object A; bidder 1 has object B.
8. Bidder 3 has object A; bidder 2 has object B.
9. Bidder 3 has both objects A and B.
Consequently, since all the three bidders participate in the resale mechanism, there may be
multiple sellers or multiple buyers, depending on the object allocation after the simultaneous
ascending auction.
Williams (1999) characterizes mechanisms that are e cient, incentive compatible and bud-
get balanced that can be applied to such multilateral settings. Any such mechanism is interim
payo↵-equivalent for every bidder to a Groves mechanism: the expected payo↵ of a bidder
with a given valuation is the same as his payo↵ in a Groves mechanism.
After the simultaneous ascending auction, let bidder i’s value be uniformly distributed on
[ai, bi]. Let pi j(✓) be the probability that bidder i owns object j, where the types of the bidders
are defined by ✓. Then, the allocation after the resale stage is e cient if
(p⇤1A(✓), p
⇤
2B(✓), p
⇤
3A(✓), p
⇤
3B(✓)) = (1, 1, 0, 0)
whenever v1A + v2B >   and
(p⇤1A(✓), p
⇤
2B(✓), p
⇤
3A(✓), p
⇤
3B(✓)) = (0, 0, 1, 1)
whenever v1A + v2B <  . In the Groves mechanism, transfers x1, x2 and x3 will be defined
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in Lemmas 3.3.1-3.3.5 below. In the basic Groves mechanism, constants k1, k2 and k3 in the
formulae for the transfers are all equal to 0.
By applying Theorem 3 in Williams (1999), we can determine if e cient resale mecha-
nisms exist.
Lemma 3.3.1 Suppose one of the following cases holds in the simultaneous ascending auction.
• Bidder 1 wins both objects A and B.
• Bidder 1 wins object A and bidder 3 wins object B.
Then, an e cient mechanism at the resale stage exists if and only if the following condition is
satisfied.
2E✓[max{v2B,     v1A}]
 E✓ 1[max{v2B,     b1}] + E✓ 2[max{a2,     v1A}] + E✓ 3[max{v2B, a3   v1A}]
Proof Suppose one of the cases holds in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then, the non-
monetary payo↵s are p1Av1A   v1A for bidder 1, p2Bv2B for bidder 2 and p3Ap3B  for bidder 3.
The Groves transfers x1, x2 and x3 that are taken from the bidders are therefore defined in the
following way.3
x1(✓) =  p⇤2B(✓)v2B   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  + k1
x2(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A + v1A   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  + k2
x3(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A + v1A   p⇤2B(✓)v2B + k3
3There are also Groves mechanisms where the constant ki is replaced by a function that depends on valuations
of the opponents of bidder i. Considering such mechanisms is not going to change the result because, from the
interim perspective, they are equivalent to mechanisms with constants k1, k2 and k3.
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Bidder 1’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U1(v1A) = E✓ 1[p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A   v1A + p⇤2B(✓)v2B + p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓) ]
= E✓ 1[max{v2B,     v1A}]
which is non-increasing in v1A, so it is minimized at v1A = b1. Define U1 = E✓ 1[max{v2B,    
b1}].
Bidder 2’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U2(v2B) = E✓ 2[p
⇤
2B(✓)v2B + p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A   v1A + p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓) ]
= E✓ 2[max{v2B,     v1A}]
which is non-decreasing in v2B, so it is minimized at v2B = a2. Define U2 = E✓ 2[max{a2,    
v1A}].
Bidder 3’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U3( ) = E✓ 3[p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓)  + p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A   v1A + p⇤2B(✓)v2B]
= E✓ 3[max{v2B,     v1A}]
which is non-decreasing in  , so it is minimized at   = a3. DefineU3 = E✓ 3[max{v2B, a3 v1A}].
Therefore, applying Theorem 3 in Williams (1999), an e cient mechanism exists if and
only if the following holds:
2E✓[max{v2B,     v1A}]
 U1 + U2 + U3
= E✓ 1[max{v2B,     b1}] + E✓ 2[max{a2,     v1A}] + E✓ 3[max{v2B, a3   v1A}].
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The main idea behind the result in Williams (1999) as applied to our settings is as follows.
The left-hand side of the inequality in the statement of Lemma 3.3.1 is the sum of the expected
transfers that have to be given to the bidders in the basic Groves mechanism. The right-hand
side of that inequality is the sum of the interim expected payo↵s of the most disadvantaged
types for each bidder in the basic Groves mechanism. If the inequality as stated in Lemma 3.3.1
is satisfied, the bidders can be taxed by an amount su cient to finance the Groves mechanism
without violating any bidder’s participation constraints.
Lemma 3.3.2 Suppose bidder 1 wins object A and bidder 2 wins object B in the simultaneous
ascending auction. Then, an e cient mechanism at the resale stage exists if and only if the
following condition is satisfied.
2E✓[max{0,     v1A   v2B}]
 E✓ 1[max{0,     b1   v2B}] + E✓ 2[max{0,     v1A   b2}] + E✓ 3[max{0, a3   v1A   v2B}]
Proof Bidder 1 wins object A and bidder 2 wins object B in the auction, so the non-monetary
payo↵s are p1Av1A   v1A for bidder 1, p2Bv2B   v2B for bidder 2 and p3Ap3B  for bidder 3. The
Groves transfers xi are therefore defined as follow.
x1(✓) =  p⇤2B(✓)v2B + v2B   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  + k1
x2(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A + v1A   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  + k2
x3(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A + v1A   p⇤2B(✓)v2B + v2B + k3
Bidder 1’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U1(v1A) = E✓ 1[p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A   v1A + p⇤2B(✓)v2B   v2B + p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓) ]
= E✓ 1[max{0,     v1A   v2B}]
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which is non-increasing in v1A, so it is minimized at v1A = b1. Define U1 = E✓ 1[max{0,    
b1   v2B}].
Bidder 2’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U2(v2B) = E✓ 2[p
⇤
2B(✓)v2B   v2B + p⇤1A(✓)v1A   v1A + p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓) ]
= E✓ 2[max{0,     v1A   v2B}]
which is non-increasing in v2B, so it is minimized at v2B = b2. Define U2 = E✓ 2[max{0,    
v1A   b2}].
Bidder 3’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U3( ) = E✓ 3[p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓)  + p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A   v1A + p⇤2B(✓)v2B   v2B]
= E✓ 3[max{0,     v1A   v2B}]
which is non-decreasing in  , so it is minimized at   = a3. Define U3 = E✓ 3[max{0, a3   v1A  
v2B}].
Therefore, applying Theorem 3 in Williams (1999), an e cient mechanism exists if and
only if the following holds.
2E✓[max{0,     v1A   v2B}]
 E✓ 1[max{0,     b1   v2B}] + E✓ 2[max{0,     v1A   b2}] + E✓ 3[max{0, a3   v1A   v2B}]
Lemma 3.3.3 Suppose one of the following cases holds in the simultaneous ascending auction.
• Bidder 2 wins object A and bidder 1 wins object B.
• Bidder 2 wins object A and bidder 3 wins object B.
• Bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 1 wins object B.
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Then, an e cient mechanism at the resale stage exists if and only if the following condition is
satisfied.
2E✓[max{v1A + v2B,  }]
 E✓ 1[max{a1 + v2B,  }] + E✓ 2[max{v1A + a2,  }] + E✓ 3[max{v1A + v2B, a3}]
Proof Suppose one of the cases holds in the simultaneous ascending auction. Then, the non-
monetary payo↵s are p1Av1A for bidder 1, p2Bv2B for bidder 2 and p3Ap3B  for bidder 3. The
Groves transfers xi are therefore defined as follow.
x1(✓) =  p⇤2B(✓)v2B   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  + k1
x2(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  + k2
x3(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A   p⇤2B(✓)v2B + k3
Bidder 1’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U1(v1A) = E✓ 1[p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A + p
⇤
2B(✓)v2B + p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓) ]
= E✓ 1[max{v1A + v2B,  }]
which is non-decreasing in v1A, so it is minimized at v1A = a1. Define U1 = E✓ 1[max{a1 +
v2B,  }].
Bidder 2’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U2(v2B) = E✓ 2[p
⇤
2B(✓)v2B + p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A + p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓) ]
= E✓ 2[max{v1A + v2B,  }]
which is non-decreasing in v2B, so it is minimized at v2B = a2. Define U2 = E✓ 2[max{v1A +
a2,  }].
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Bidder 3’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U3( ) = E✓ 3[p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓)  + p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A + p
⇤
2B(✓)v2B]
= E✓ 3[max{v1A + v2B,  }]
which is non-decreasing in  , so it is minimized at   = a3. DefineU3 = E✓ 3[max{v1A+v2B, a3}].
Therefore, applying Theorem 3 in Williams (1999), an e cient mechanism exists if and
only if the following holds.
2E✓[max{v1A + v2B,  }]
 E✓ 1[max{a1 + v2B,  }] + E✓ 2[max{v1A + a2,  }] + E✓ 3[max{v1A + v2B, a3}]
Lemma 3.3.4 Suppose one of the following cases holds in the simultaneous ascending auction.
• Bidder 2 wins both objects A and B.
• Bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 2 wins object B.
Then, an e cient mechanism at the resale stage exists if and only if the following condition is
satisfied.
2E✓[max{v1A,     v2B}]
 E✓ 1[max{a1,     v2B}] + E✓ 2[max{v1A,     b2}] + E✓ 3[max{v1A, a3   v2B}]
Proof This is symmetric to Lemma 3.3.1.
Lemma 3.3.5 Suppose bidder 3 wins both objects A and B in the simultaneous ascending
auction. Then, an e cient mechanism at the resale stage exists if and only if the following
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condition is satisfied.
2E✓[max{0, v1A + v2B    }]
 E✓ 1[max{0, a1 + v2B    }] + E✓ 2[max{0, v1A + a2    }] + E✓ 3[max{0, v1A + v2B   b3}]
Proof Bidder 3 wins both objects A and B in the auction, so the non-monetary payo↵s are
p1Av1A for bidder 1, p2Bv2B for bidder 2 and p1Ap2B      for bidder 3. The Groves transfers xi
are therefore defined as follow.
x1(✓) =  p⇤2B(✓)v2B   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  +   + k1
x2(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A   p⇤3A(✓)p⇤3B(✓)  +   + k2
x3(✓) =  p⇤1A(✓)v1A   p⇤2B(✓)v2B + k3
Bidder 1’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U1(v1A) = E✓ 1[p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A + p
⇤
2B(✓)v2B + p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓)     ]
= E✓ 1[max{0, v1A + v2B    }]
which is non-decreasing in v1A, so it is minimized at v1A = a1. Define U1 = E✓ 1[max{0, a1 +
v2B    }].
Bidder 2’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U2(v2B) = E✓ 2[p
⇤
2B(✓)v2B + p
⇤
1A(✓)v1A + p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓)     ]
= E✓ 2[max{0, v1A + v2B    }]
which is non-decreasing in v2B, so it is minimized at v2B = a2. Define U2 = E✓ 2[max{0, v1A +
a2    }].
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Bidder 3’s interim utility in basic Groves mechanism is
U3( ) = E✓ 3[p
⇤
3A(✓)p
⇤
3B(✓)      + p⇤1A(✓)v1A + p⇤2B(✓)v2B]
= E✓ 3[max{0, v1A + v2B    }]
which is non-increasing in  , so it is minimized at   = b3. Define U3 = E✓ 3[max{0, v1A + v2B  
b3}].
Therefore, applying Theorem 3 in Williams (1999), an e cient mechanism exists if and
only if the following holds.
2E✓[max{0, v1A + v2B    }]
 E✓ 1[max{0, a1 + v2B    }] + E✓ 2[max{0, v1A + a2    }] + E✓ 3[max{0, v1A + v2B   b3}]
Lemmas 3.3.1-3.3.5 cover all nine possible allocations after the simultaneous ascending
auctions.
3.4 An e cient equilibrium
For collusion in English auctions, Garratt, Tro¨ger, and Zheng (2009) construct a family of
equilibria in which one designated bidder wins the auction without any competition. The spoils
of collusion are then divided among members of the bidding ring through a resale mechanism
that the reseller chooses. Without resale, such bidding strategies are weakly dominated; with
resale, Garratt, Tro¨ger, and Zheng (2009) show that such strategies are not weakly dominated.
I construct a similar equilibrium, where the speculators win the auction without any com-
petition. Let   > 0. Suppose the bidders bid according to the following in the simultaneous
ascending auction.
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• Bidder 1 drops out of the auction for object A at 0 and drops out of the auction for object
B at  .
• Bidder 2 drops out of the auction for object A at   and drops out of the auction for object
B at 0.
• Bidder 3 drops out of both auctions at 0.
If a local bidder does not follow the prescribed strategies, the other local bidder and the
global bidder believe that the local bidder’s value vi j is distributed uniformly on [0, 1]. If the
global bidder does not follow the prescribed strategies, the local bidders believe that the global
bidder’s value   is distributed uniformly on [0, 2].
The resale mechanism is assumed to be budget balanced, so the following equation holds.
E✓[x1(✓) + x2(✓) + x3(✓)] = 0 (3.1)
If there exist multiple solutions, then an equitable solution is chosen as described below.
Let the net interim expected utility of bidder i with value vi from participation in the resale
mechanism be denoted by eUi(vi). Individual rationality requires that eUi(vi)   0 for every
i and vi. If there are multiple solutions, then we choose the solution that divides the extra
surplus equally between the most disadvantaged types of the players (specifically, such that
minv1A fU1(v1A) = minv2B fU2(v2B) = min  fU3( )).
If a fully e cient mechanism is feasible, then eUi(vi) = Ui(vi)   ki, where Ui(vi) is the
net interim expected utility of player i with value vi from participation in the basic Groves
mechanism, and ki is a constant transfer taken away from bidder i for balancing the budget.
Note that minvi eUi(vi) = Ui   ki, where Ui was defined in Lemmas 3.3.1-3.3.5 above. Thus
individual rationality in this case can be written as
Ui   ki. (3.2)
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The constants k1, k2 and k3 are chosen such that the extra surplus is divided equally among
the three bidders so the following equation is satisfied.
U1   k1 = U2   k2 = U3   k3 (3.3)
Then, we claim that an equilibrium where the bidders bid according to the prescribed strate-
gies exists. Moreover, in this equilibrium, even though the simultaneous ascending auction
allocates the objects to the speculators, e ciency is fully restored at the resale stage.
Proposition 3.4.1 Let v1A and v2B be independently and identically distributed uniformly on
[0, 1]; let   be distributed uniformly on [0, 2]. Let     2. Then it is an equilibrium for the
bidders to use the above prescribed strategies in the simultaneous ascending auction. The
outcome of the overall game in this case is e cient.
Proof First, it is necessary to establish the bidders’ interim utilities in the resale stage. We
need to consider the following cases in which kzi denote constants where z indicates case z and
i indicates bidder i.
1. Suppose bidder 1 wins both objects A and B. Suppose the beliefs are that v1A and v2B
are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and   is distributed uniformly on
[0, 2].
Then,
2E✓[max{v2B,     v1A}] = 1912
and
E✓ 1[max{v2B,     1}] + E✓ 2[max{0,     v1A}] + E✓ 3[max{v2B, v1A}] = 712 +
7
12
+
1
2
=
20
12
.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.3.1, an e cient mechanism at the resale stage exists.
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Budget balance (Equation (3.1)) requires that 1912 = k11 + k12 + k13, whereas individual
rationality (Inequality (3.2)) requires that 712   k11, 712   k12 and 12   k13. Finally, by the
rule that the extra surplus is divided equally among the three bidders (Equation (3.3)),
7
12   k11 = 712   k12 = 12   k13. Therefore, k11 = 59 , k12 = 59 and k13 = 1736 .
Bidder 1’s interim utility is
U1(v1A) = E✓ 1[max{v2B,     v1A}]   k11
=
1
4
v21A   34v1A +
13
12
  5
9
=
1
4
v21A   34v1A +
19
36
.
Bidder 2’s interim utility is
U2(v2B) = E✓ 2[max{v2B,     v1A}]   k12
=
1
4
v22B +
1
4
v2B +
7
12
  5
9
=
1
4
v22B +
1
4
v2B +
1
36
.
Bidder 3’s interim utility is
U3( ) = E✓ 3[max{v2B,     v1A}]   k13
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
5
6     +  2   16 3   1736 if   > 1
1
2 +
1
6 
3   1736 if    1
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
13
36     +  2   16 3 if   > 1
1
36 +
1
6 
3 if    1
.
2. Suppose bidder 1 wins object A and bidder 3 wins object B. Suppose the beliefs are
that v1A and v2B are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and   is distributed
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uniformly on [0, 2].
Then, Lemma 3.3.1 applies and this case is the same as case 1 above.
3. Suppose bidder 2 wins object A and bidder 1 wins object B. Suppose the beliefs are
that v1A and v2B are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1];   is distributed
uniformly on [0, 2].
Then,
2E✓[max{v1A + v2B,  }] = 3112
and
E✓ 1[max{v2B,  }] + E✓ 2[max{v1A,  }] + E✓ 3[max{v1A + v2B, 0}] = 1312 +
13
12
+ 1
=
19
6
.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.3.3, an e cient mechanism at the resale stage exists.
Budget balance (Equation (3.1)) requires that 3112 = k3a1 + k3a2 + k3a3, whereas individual
rationality (Inequality (3.2)) requires that 1312   k3a1, 1312   k3a2 and 1   k3a3. Finally,
by the rule that the extra surplus is divided equally among the three bidders (Equation
(3.3)), 1312   k3a1 = 1312   k3a2 = 1   k3a3. Therefore, k3a1 = 89 , k3a2 = 89 and k3a3 = 2936 .
Bidder 1’s interim utility is
U1(v1A) = E✓ 1[max{v1A + v2B,  }]   k3a1
=
1
4
v21A +
1
4
v1A +
13
12
  8
9
=
1
4
v21A +
1
4
v1A +
7
36
.
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Bidder 2’s interim utility is
U2(v2B) = E✓ 2[max{v1A + v2B,  }]   k3a2
=
1
4
v22B +
1
4
v2B +
13
12
  8
9
=
1
4
v22B +
1
4
v2B +
7
36
.
Bidder 3’s interim utility is
U3( ) = E✓ 3[max{v1A + v2B,  }]   k3a3
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
4
3     +  2   16 3   2936 if   > 1
1 + 16 
3   2936 if    1
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
19
36     +  2   16 3 if   > 1
7
36 +
1
6 
3 if    1
.
4. Suppose bidder 2 wins object A and bidder 3 wins object B. Suppose the beliefs are
that v1A and v2B are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1];   is distributed
uniformly on [0, 2].
Then, Lemma 3.3.3 applies and this case is the same as case 3 above.
5. Suppose bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 1 wins object B. Suppose the beliefs are
that v1A and v2B are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1];   is distributed
uniformly on [0, 2].
Then, Lemma 3.3.3 applies and this case is the same as 3 above.
6. Suppose bidder 2 wins both objects A and B. Suppose the beliefs are that v1A and v2B
are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and   is distributed uniformly on
[0, 2].
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Then, Lemma 3.3.4 applies and this is symmetric to case 1 above. Therefore, bidder 1’s
interim utility is
U1(v1A) = E✓ 1[max{v1A,     v2B}]   k61
=
1
4
v21A +
1
4
v1A +
1
36
.
Bidder 2’s interim utility is
U2(v2B) = E✓ 2[max{v1A,     v2B}]   k62
=
1
4
v22B   34v2B +
19
36
.
Bidder 3’s interim utility is
U3( ) = E✓ 3[max{v1A,     v2B}]   k63
=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
13
36     +  2   16 3 if   > 1
1
36 +
1
6 
3 if    1
.
7. Suppose bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 2 wins object B. Suppose the beliefs are
that v1A and v2B are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and   is distributed
uniformly on [0, 2].
Then, Lemma 3.3.4 applies and this is the same as case 6 above.
8. Suppose bidder 3 wins both objects A and B. Suppose the beliefs are that v1A and v2B are
independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and that   is uniformly distributed on
[0, 2].
Then,
2E✓[max{0, v1A + v2B    }] = 712
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and
E✓ 1[max{0, v2B    }] + E✓ 2[max{0, v1A    }] + E✓ 3[max{0, v1A + v2B   2}]
=
1
12
+
1
12
+ 0
=
1
6
.
Therefore, by Lemma 3.3.5, there does not exist an e cient mechanism at the resale
stage. Bidder 3 of type   = 0 will benefit the most from resale because he does not value
the objects at all. Bidders 1 and 2 are not willing to pay more than their values v1A and
v2B for objects A and B respectively. Thus the interim utility that bidder 3 can get from a
mechanism at this stage is bounded above by 2.
Now we consider the entire game and show that the proposed strategies constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium.
(I) Consider a history where bidder 1 has won object B at price pB 2 [0,  ) while the auction
for object A is still going on and the current price is pA 2 [pB,  ]. The case where bidder
2 has won object A at price pA 2 [0,  ) while the auction for object B is still going on is
symmetric.
The strategies prescribe that bidders 1 and 3 drop out immediately and bidder 2 continue
bidding until  .
If all three bidders follow the prescribed strategies, then bidder 2 wins object A and the
beliefs are that v1A and v2B are independently and uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and that
  is distributed uniformly on [0, 2]. By case 3, there exists an e cient mechanism at the
resale stage. Then, in equilibrium, bidder 1’s expected payo↵ is
U1(v1A) =
1
4
v21A +
1
4
v1A +
7
36
  pB, (3.4)
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bidder 2’s expected payo↵ is
U2(v2B) =
1
4
v22B +
1
4
v2B +
7
36
  pA (3.5)
and bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is
U3( ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
19
36     +  2   16 3 if   > 1
7
36 +
1
6 
3 if    1
. (3.6)
If bidder 1 drops out at price p0A 2 [pA,  ] instead while bidders 2 and 3 follow the
prescribed strategies, then bidder 2 still wins object A. The beliefs are una↵ected, so
bidder 1’s expected payo↵ remains the same. If bidder 1 stays in the auction after the
price is above   instead while bidders 2 and 3 follow the prescribed strategies, then
bidder 1 wins object A. The beliefs remain the same. By case 1, there exists an e cient
mechanism at the resale stage. Bidder 1’s expected payo↵ is
(v1A       pB) + (14v
2
1A   34v1A +
19
36
) =
1
4
v21A +
1
4
v1A +
19
36
      pB
which is strictly less than Equation (3.4) since     2. Hence bidder 1 does not have
profitable deviations.
If bidder 2 drops out immediately at pA instead while bidders 1 and 3 drop out immedi-
ately as prescribed, bidder 2 wins object A since bidder 2 is a speculator in the auction
for object A and ties involving speculators are broken in their favour. The beliefs are
una↵ected. By case 3, there exists an e cient mechanism at the resale stage. Bidder
2’s expected payo↵ is the same as the expected payo↵ if he had followed the prescribed
strategies. If bidder 2 stays in the auction after the price goes above pA while bidders
1 and 3 drop out immediately as prescribed, then bidder 2 wins object A. The beliefs
are una↵ected and thus bidder 2’s expected payo↵ is the same as if he had followed the
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prescribed strategies. Hence bidder 2 does not have profitable deviations.
If bidder 3 drops out at price p0A 2 [pA,  ] instead while bidders 1 and 2 follow the
prescribed strategies, bidder 2 wins object A. The beliefs are una↵ected. By case 3, there
exists an e cient mechanism at the resale stage. Bidder 3’s expected payo↵ remains the
same. If bidder 3 stays in the auction after the price is above   instead while bidders
1 and 2 follow the prescribed strategies, then bidder 3 wins object A. The beliefs are
una↵ected. By case 5, there exists an e cient mechanism at the resale stage. Bidder 3’s
expected payo↵ is
U3( ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
   + 1936     +  2   16 3 if   > 1
   + 736 + 16 3 if    1
which is strictly less than Equation (3.6) since     2. Hence bidder 3 does not have
profitable deviations.
(II) Consider a history such that both auctions are still going on and the current prices are
pA = pB = p 2 [0,  ]. The strategies prescribe that bidder 1 drop out immediately of the
auction for object A and continue until   in the auction for object B, bidder 2 continue
until   in the auction for object A and drop out immediately of the auction for object B,
and bidder 3 drop out immediately of both auctions.
Suppose all bidders follow the prescribed strategies. Then bidder 2 wins object A and
bidder 1 wins object B. The beliefs are that v1A and v2B are independently and uniformly
distributed on [0, 1] and   is uniformly distributed on [0, 2]. By case 3, there exists an
e cient mechanism at the resale stage. Bidder 1’s expected payo↵ is Equation (3.4) with
p instead of pB, bidder 2’s expected payo↵ is Equation (3.5) with p instead of pA, and
bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is Equation (3.6).
Now let us consider various deviations for the bidders. We have previously shown that
the prescribed strategies are sequentially rational for the bidders in cases when only one
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of the auctions is still going on. We have only considered histories where either of the
following is true:
(a) Bidder 1 has won object B and the auction for object A continues.
(b) Bidder 2 has won object A and the auction for object B continues.
It is straightforward to verify that these are the only relevant histories where only one auc-
tion continues that can be reached by unilateral deviations from the equilibrium strategy
profile. Thus, for each bidder, we will consider all alternative drop out prices provided
that both auctions are still going on; if only one of the auctions is still going on, we will
take it that the bidders are following the prescribed strategies.
Suppose bidder 1 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A 2 (p,  ] and drops out of the
auction for object B at p0B   p instead. Then bidder 2 wins object A and bidder 1 still
wins object B. The beliefs are una↵ected. By case 3, there exists an e cient mechanism
at the resale stage. Bidder 1’s expected payo↵ is the same as if he had followed the
prescribed strategies. Therefore, this is not a profitable deviation.
Suppose bidder 1 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A >   and drops out of the
auction for object B at p0B   p instead. Then bidder 1 wins both objects A and B. The
beliefs are una↵ected. By case 1, there exists an e cient mechanism at the resale stage.
Bidder 1’s expected payo↵ is
(v1A       p) + (14v
2
1A   34v1A +
19
36
) =
1
4
v21A +
1
4
v1A +
19
36
      p
which is strictly less than Equation (3.4) since     2. Therefore, bidder 1 does not have
profitable deviations.
Suppose bidder 2 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A   p and drops out of the
auction for object B at p0B 2 (p,  ] instead. Then bidder 2 still wins object A and bidder 1
wins object B. The beliefs are una↵ected. By case 3, there exists an e cient mechanism
82 Chapter 3. Speculators in simultaneous ascending auctions
at the resale stage. Bidder 2’s expected payo↵ is the same as if he had followed the
prescribed strategies. Therefore, this is not a profitable deviation.
Suppose bidder 2 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A   p and drops out of the
auction for object B at p0B >   instead. Then bidder 2 wins both objects A and B. The
beliefs are una↵ected. By case 6, there exists an e cient mechanism at the resale stage.
Bidder 2’s expected payo↵ is
(v2B   p    ) + (14v
2
2B   34v2B +
19
36
) =
1
4
v22B +
1
4
v2B +
19
36
  p    
which is strictly less than Equation (3.5) since     2. Therefore, bidder 2 does not have
profitable deviations.
Suppose bidder 3 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A 2 (p,  ] and drops out of
the auction for object B at p0B 2 (p,  ] instead. Then bidder 2 wins object A and bidder 1
wins object B. The beliefs are una↵ected. By case 3, there exists an e cient mechanism
at the resale stage. Bidder 3’s expected payo↵ remains the same.
Suppose bidder 3 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A 2 (p,  ] and drops out of the
auction for object B at p0B >   instead. Then bidder 2 wins object A and bidder 3 wins
object B. The beliefs are una↵ected. By case 4, there exists an e cient mechanism at
the resale stage. Bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is
U3( ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
   + 1936     +  2   16 3 if   > 1
   + 736 + 16 3 if    1
which is strictly less than Equation (3.6) since     2.
Suppose bidder 3 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A >   and drops out of the
auction for object B at p0B 2 (p,  ] instead. Then bidder 3 wins object A and bidder 1
wins object B. The beliefs are una↵ected. By case 5, there exists an e cient mechanism
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at the resale stage. Bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is
U3( ) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
   + 1936     +  2   16 3 if   > 1
   + 736 + 16 3 if    1
which is strictly less than Equation (3.6) since     2.
Suppose bidder 3 drops out of the auction for object A at p0A >   and drops out of the
auction for object B at p0B >   instead. Then bidder 3 wins both objects A and B. The
beliefs are una↵ected. By case 8, there does not exist an e cient mechanism at the resale
stage. An upper bound for bidder 3’s expected payo↵ is
(    2 ) + 2
which is strictly less than Equation (3.6) since     2. Therefore, bidder 3 does not have
profitable deviations.
Therefore, the prescribed strategies constitute an e cient perfect Bayesian equilibrium
with resale.
3.5 Conclusion
The simultaneous ascending auction is a standard method to sell multiple heterogeneous ob-
jects. This paper is an attempt to investigate the e↵ects of resale on the allocation e ciency of
the simultaneous ascending auction.
We study a model with two objects and three bidders. In the previous chapter, we find
that there is no equilibrium in which the simultaneous ascending auction allocates the objects
e ciently. This result holds with or without resale and this result is independent of the resale
mechanism.
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In this paper, we extend the model previously studied in the following ways.
• Rather than banning speculators, we allow speculators in the simultaneous ascending
auction.
• Rather than using a fixed resale mechanism, there is a social planner whose role is to
o↵er the bidders resale mechanisms that maximize e ciency.
Under some conditions, we find that it is possible for resale to restore e ciency. As shown
in Chapter 2, it is impossible to achieve e cient allocation in all states of the world through the
simultaneous ascending auction alone. Thus, post-auction misallocations have to be corrected
through resale which takes place under residual asymmetric information that was not revealed
in the course of the auction. The assumption about e cient resale mechanism ensures that the
focus of resale is to achieve e ciency rather than to maximize the profit of the winners of the
objects in the auction. The feature of the constructed equilibrium that the speculators own the
objects at the start of the resale stage helps to relax participation constraints of the bidders in
the resale process as much as possible because the speculators have no use value for the objects
they have won in the auction.
Although we have some characteristics of the e cient resale mechanisms, we have not
explored how some of these e cient resale mechanisms may be implemented. We leave this
to future research.
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Chapter 4
Competing for a committee’s approval
4.1 Introduction
The art of persuasion is practised early on in life, as when a child tries to convince his parents
that he indeed deserves another cookie or ice cream. While research on the art of persuasion is
well established in the economics literature, the focus of the literature has been on the persua-
sion of a single decision maker. Although there are many examples where the decision maker is
indeed a single person, group decisions are becoming more prevalent. In Canada, committees
in the House of Commons and the Senate hold considerable influence over legislative outcomes
that potentially a↵ect the entire country; academic appointments are made by committees or
departments. Some persuasion strategies, such as “selective communication” (the sponsor of
an idea or project talks to select members of the group only) and “persuasion cascades” (see
next paragraph for details), can be relied upon only in group persuasion, so the dynamics of
group persuasion can be much richer and more complex than what is already in the literature.
Caillaud and Tirole (2007) study persuasion cascades. Specifically, they show that, rather
than trying to persuade every single member in a committee individually into adopting a
project, the sponsor of the project stands to benefit by targeting key members in the com-
mittee and obtaining their approval before using their support for his project to convince the
86
4.1. Introduction 87
other members of the committee that his project is indeed worthwhile and beneficial for them.
In addition, they show that the sponsor benefits more if the correlation between committee
members’ benefits is positive and higher. The size of the committee and how aligned the com-
mittee members’ interests are to that of the sponsor also play a role in the sponsor’s strategy
and ability to get his project approved.
In many cases, however, there are multiple sponsors or projects competing for a com-
mittee’s approval: for example, there are typically many applicants for a limited number of
academic vacancies in universities. Hence, a very natural question that arises is, how would
the presence of multiple sponsors change the game of group persuasion? How would the com-
petition between sponsors play out?
We introduce a model with two senders and a two-member committee of receivers. Each
sender is a sponsor of a project; the senders may disclose information about their projects to the
committee. If committee members receive information from the project sponsors and wish to
investigate further, they may do so at a cost. Finally, the committee members vote and approve
one of the two competing projects.
Caillaud and Tirole (2007) assume that communication can take place only between the
sender and committee members. The sender engineers the persuasion cascades by letting one
committee member investigate and then revealing that investigator’s support for the sender’s
project to the other committee member. Although Caillaud and Tirole find that the sponsor can
obtain the same expected utility when communication channels between committee members
exist, they acknowledge that their robustness result is fragile due to several reasons.
In contrast, we study cases where committee members can and cannot observe another
committee member’s investigation result separately. By studying a two-member committee
with identical members and perfectly correlated benefits, we find that the ability to observe
another committee member’s investigation result has interesting implications. If committee
members’ benefits are perfectly correlated and each member is allowed to observe the result
of an investigation carried out by another member, then this committee is equivalent to a dic-
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tatorial committee. On the other hand, if a committee member is not allowed to observe the
result of an investigation carried out by another member, then this committee is equivalent to a
committee with two identical members but with independent benefits. By studying the problem
thus, we find di↵erent thresholds for the investigation cost in di↵erent circumstances.
Investigation of a project allows a committee member to learn his exact benefit from a
project if that project is approved, so he knows not to vote for a project that will give him a
negative payo↵. However, investigation is not free, so a committee member chooses to inves-
tigate only if the cost of investigation is su ciently low. Identical members of a two-member
committee with independent benefits investigate less often than a dictator because their con-
straint on the investigation cost is more restrictive. The sponsor of the weaker project prefers
a very low investigation cost, whereas his competitor benefits from a higher investigation cost
and a committee that is equivalent to one with independent benefits.
4.2 Literature
This chapter is connected to several strands of literature. First, this chapter is related to a large
literature on decision-making in committees. Persico (2004) studies a committee of identical
agents who can each pay for a noisy signal of the actual state of the world; the agents cannot
communicate prior to voting. Gerardi and Yariv (2003) allow for communication between
committee members after they acquire the costly signals. Zhao (2018) studies a heterogeneous
committee where each member can unilaterally acquire an imperfect signal about the state; all
information acquired is publicly observable. In addition to the committee making the decision,
this chapter builds a model with two senders competing for the committee’s approval.
Secondly, there is some research on persuasion with multiple senders in the absence of
investigation costs. For example, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) study games where multi-
ple senders choose what information to communicate and find that the e↵ect of competition
between these senders on information revelation is ambiguous. In contrast, it is costly for
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committee members to investigate in this chapter.
Finally, this chapter is most closely related to Caillaud and Tirole (2007) and Perez-Richet
(2012). Caillaud and Tirole (2007) build a one-sender/multi-receiver model of persuasion to
study strategies that the sponsor of a proposal may employ to persuade a qualified majority
of committee members into approving the proposal. Perez-Richet (2012) studies strategic in-
formation disclosure between multiple senders and a single receiver. Competing senders have
information that is verifiable and equivocal; they decide whether to disclose this information
to the receiver or not. Perez-Richet finds that, as competition increases, all candidates disclose
information only if some of the candidates are unlikely to have favourable information. This
chapter studies the case where there are two senders and two receivers, so there are essentially
two sponsors competing for the committee’s approval.
4.3 Model
The model in this chapter is largely based on the model in Caillaud and Tirole (2007). Here,
however, there is an N-member committee that must decide which one of two proposed projects
(A, B) to approve. These two projects are separately proposed by two sponsors, who are simi-
larly denoted by A and B as well. Committee members simultaneously vote for project A or for
project B; committee members are not allowed to abstain and the adopted project is determined
by a voting rule to be defined later.
Sponsor A gets s > 0 if his project is adopted and 0 otherwise. Similarly, sponsor B gets
s > 0 if his project is adopted and 0 otherwise. The sponsor’s benefit s is common knowledge
and each sponsor wants to maximize the expected probability that the project he has proposed
is approved.
If project j 2 {A, B} is approved, committee member i gets ri j, where ri j 2 {G, L} and
L < 0 < G. Committee member i’s benefit from project j is a priori unknown to anyone; the
realization of ri j in case project j is implemented is not verifiable.
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Committee member i can accept or reject project j on the basis of his prior pi j ⌘ Pr{ri j =
G}. Otherwise, if sponsor j provides a detailed report to committee member i, the committee
member may investigate the report and learn his exact benefit from project j. The sponsors do
not have superior information and it is completely free for the sponsors to write and provide
reports to the committee members. While the detailed reports provided by the sponsors do not
contain information about ri j, the reports contain su cient details and data to let committee
member i find out the consequences of the projects for his own benefit as long as he is willing
to pay the investigation cost. If a committee member is given reports by both sponsors, he is
restricted to investigating only one report, if he indeed chooses to investigate. Investigation
is not verifiable and is therefore subject to moral hazard. The cost of investigation c > 0 is
the same for all committee members. Another assumption about the investigation cost is that,
if a committee member is indi↵erent between rubber-stamping (approving a project without
having first investigated) and investigation, he would investigate. If committee member i does
not investigate, he may use the correlation structure of benefits {ri j}Ni=1 to infer information
about his own benefit based on the fact that another committee member has investigated and
subsequently approved project j. All realized priors and the correlation structure of benefits
{ri j}Ni=1 are assumed to be common knowledge.
For project j 2 {A, B}, let Pj = Pr{r1 j = r2 j = G} denote the joint probability that both
committee members benefit from project j. Di↵erent assumptions on Pj will be considered
in this chapter: committee members’ benefits could be independent, perfectly correlated, or
positively correlated. Benefits are assumed to be independent across projects.
Caillaud and Tirole (2007) take a mechanism design approach in their analysis of the game
with one sponsor and multiple committee members. However, it is not entirely obvious how a
mechanism design approach would work for two sponsors and multiple committee members,1
so a game is specified. Finally, the game proceeds as follow:
1Caillaud and Tirole (2007) note that building an equilibrium-mechanism-design methodology for competing
sponsors is a very challenging endeavour. Yamashita (2010) studies a class of mechanism games with multiple
principals and three or more agents; he notes that the result is ambiguous if there are only two agents.
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1. Sponsors simultaneously decide to withhold information, to provide a detailed report to
one of the committee members, or to send reports to both committee members.
2. Each committee member observes the decisions of the sponsors; if he receives at least
one report, he decides whether to investigate or not.
3. We consider two possible scenarios:
(a) Each committee member observes the outcome of the investigation carried out by
the other committee member. (See Section 4.6.1.)
(b) Committee members do not observe the outcomes of other members’ investiga-
tions. (See Section 4.6.2.)
4. If there is only one member in the committee, he approves either project A or project B.
If there are two members in the committee, they simultaneously vote for either project A
or project B; the decision rule from the vote is as follows.
Member 2
A B
Member 1 A A
1
2A +
1
2B
B 12A +
1
2B B
Table 4.1: Voting rule of the committee.
That is, if both committee members vote for project j, then project j is approved. Other-
wise, they toss a fair coin to determine which project to approve.
We use subgame perfect equilibrium with refinements as the solution concept in this chap-
ter. We consider pure strategies only. If a committee member receives reports from both
sponsors A and B and is indi↵erent between investigating project A and investigating project B,
he tosses a fair coin to decide which project to investigate. Furthermore, in cases where both
committee members are given reports but only one investigates, the committee members toss
a fair coin to determine which committee member investigates. This is done such that there is
e ciency at the investigation stage.
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4.4 Dictator
First, consider the case where the decision-making committee consists of only one person. The
dictator has priors pA = Pr{GA} and pB = Pr{GB}, where GA is defined as the dictator getting
G from the project proposed by sponsor A and GB is defined as the dictator getting G from the
project proposed by sponsor B. (Since there is only one member, the subscript i denoting the
committee member is dropped in this section.)
When rubber-stamping project j without investigation, the expected benefit to the decision
maker is pjG+ (1  pj)L. The decision maker votes for whichever project gives him the higher
expected benefit, so he votes according to his priors. If the decision maker is given a detailed
report on project A and he chooses to investigate project A, his expected benefit is
pAG + (1   pA)[pBG + (1   pB)L]   c = (pA + pB   pApB)(G   L) + L   c.
That is, he realizes, as a result of his investigation, if he would get G or L from project A.
Upon realizing that his benefit is G, he votes for project A; otherwise, he votes for project B
even though he has no information about the project. His expected benefit from project B is
pBG + (1   pB)L. Since project A yields G with probability pA and yields L with probability
(1   pA), his expected benefit is pAG + (1   pA)[pBG + (1   pB)L]   c after taking into account
the investigation cost. Similarly, if the decision maker is given a detailed report on project B
and he chooses to investigate project B, his expected benefit is
pBG + (1   pB)[pAG + (1   pA)L]   c = (pA + pB   pApB)(G   L) + L   c.
Clearly, the decision maker is indi↵erent between investigating project A and investigating
project B since his expected benefit is the same from investigating either project. Suppose that,
if both sponsors provide detailed reports on the projects, the decision maker tosses a fair coin
to decide which project to investigate.
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Suppose pB > pA. (The case where pA > pB is symmetric.) In this case, the decision maker
investigates, if given the chance, if and only if his expected benefit from investigating a project
is at least as large as his expected benefit from rubber-stamping project B:
[(pA + pB   pApB)(G   L) + L   c]   [pB(G   L) + L]   0
() pA(1   pB)(G   L)   c (4.1)
If the investigation cost c is too high, the decision maker would rubber-stamp a project
according to his priors rather than investigate any project, even if given the chance; thus, there
is nothing the sponsors can do to a↵ect the decision maker’s choice of project. On the other
hand, if the investigation cost c is su ciently low, sponsors compete for the decision maker’s
approval. The sponsors’ behaviour can then be captured by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.4.1 Let pB > pA. Suppose the investigation cost c is su ciently low, i.e. (4.1) is
satisfied.
1. If pA + pB > 1, each sponsor provides the decision maker with a detailed report; the
expected payo↵s to the sponsors are (12 (1 + pA   pB)s, 12 (1   pA + pB)s).
2. If pA + pB < 1, only sponsor A provides a detailed report to the decision maker; the
expected payo↵s to the sponsors are (pAs, (1   pA)s).
Proof Since c is su ciently low, the decision maker prefers to investigate when given the
option. Sponsor j can then try to influence the decision maker’s choice of project by providing
a detailed report to the decision maker (denoted by Yj) or not (denoted by Nj).
If both sponsors do not provide reports (NA,NB), then the decision maker cannot investigate
even though he prefers to; hence, he votes according to his priors and approves project B since
pB > pA by assumption. Therefore, the sponsors’ payo↵s are (0, s).
If sponsor A provides a report and sponsor B withholds information (YA,NB), then the
decision maker investigates project A since he prefers to investigate and has only one report
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to investigate. From the investigation, the decision maker learns if the project yields G or L.
If the project yields G, he approves project A; if the project yields L, he approves project B.
Therefore, he approves project A with probability pA and approves project B with probability
(1   pA). The sponsors’ payo↵s are thus (pAs, (1   pA)s).
The other cases can be analyzed in a similar fashion.
Sponsor B
NB YB
Sponsor A NA 0, s (1   pB)s, pBsYA pAs, (1   pA)s 12 (1 + pA   pB)s, 12 (1   pA + pB)s
Table 4.2: Payo↵s of the sponsors in the benchmark case with a dictator making the decision.
If pA + pB > 1, YA is a dominant strategy for sponsor A. The Nash equilibrium of the game
is (YA,YB), where both sponsors provide detailed reports to the decision maker.
On the other hand, if pA + pB < 1, NB is a dominant strategy for sponsor B. The Nash equi-
librium of the game is then (YA,NB), where sponsor A provides a detailed report and sponsor B
withholds information.
From Proposition 4.4.1, we see that the sponsor with the weaker project (in the eyes of the
decision maker) gives information to the decision maker in every equilibrium; the sponsor with
the stronger project either provides or withholds information. As such, if the sponsor with the
stronger project withholds information, then the decision maker adopts the stronger project if
and only if the weaker project fails to yield G, with probability (1   pA). Since the objective
of the sponsor is to maximize the expected probability that his project is approved, he can
improve his chances of getting a positive benefit if he also provides information when pB is
high enough. On the other hand, if pB is too low, then his chances of getting a positive benefit
are improved by withholding information and simply relying on the weaker project yielding L.
This is di↵erent from the result found by Perez-Richet (2012), where the presence of weak
candidates in the competition is required for full disclosure of information. The decision maker
in the model studied by Perez-Richet (2012) prioritizes his investigations according to his pri-
ors, so strong candidates who do not disclose information incur a non-disclosure cost because
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the decision maker favours the strong candidates who provide information by investigating,
and hence approving if the outcome is positive, those projects first.
Since the decision maker in this model is indi↵erent between investigating either project,
the assumption is that he randomizes when deciding which project to investigate. According to
Proposition 4.4.1, the stronger candidate chooses to withhold information when his opponent
is very weak and disclose information when his opponent is relatively strong. Thus, it is rather
the stronger opponents that lead to more information revelation here.
4.5 Two-member committee: identical members with inde-
pendent benefits
Suppose there are two members in the committee (N = 2) with common priors (piA = pA, piB =
pB for all i). In this section only, assume that committee members’ benefits {ri j}2i=1 are indepen-
dent for each j 2 {A, B}. In particular, for j 2 {A, B}, the joint probability that both committee
members benefit from project j is Pj = Pr{r1 j = r2 j = G} = p2j . Again, we consider the case
with pB > pA only, since the case where pA > pB is symmetric.
If none of the committee members investigates, both members vote according to their pri-
ors. Since they have common priors, the project that has a higher probability of yielding G to
the committee members is approved. With probability pB, a committee member gets G; with
probability (1   pB), he gets L. Therefore, his expected benefit from project B is
pBG + (1   pB)L = pB(G   L) + L.
If committee member 1 investigates project A and committee member 2 does not investigate
at all, then committee member 1 learns if he gets G or L from project A. Hence, he votes for A
if he knows he will getG and votes for B otherwise. Therefore, he votes for A with probability
pA and votes for B with probability (1   pA).
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Committee member 2 has no information, so he votes according to his expected payo↵s
from projects, given the fact that committee member 1 has investigated. First, consider the case
where he votes A. With probability pA, both committee members vote for A; with probability
(1   pA), committee member 1 votes for B, so project A is approved with probability 12 and
project B is approved with probability
1
2
. His expected benefit is thus
pA[pA(G   L) + L] + (1   pA)
(
1
2
[pA(G   L) + L] + 12[pB(G   L) + L]
)
=
1
2
(p2A + pA + pB   pApB)(G   L) + L.
Now, consider the case where he votes B. With probability pA, committee member 1 votes A,
so project A is approved with probability
1
2
and project B is approved with probability
1
2
; with
probability (1   pA), committee member 1 votes for B too, so B is approved. His expected
benefit is thus
pA
(
1
2
[pA(G   L) + L] + 12[pB(G   L) + L]
)
+ (1   pA)[pB(G   L) + L]
=
 
1
2
p2A + pB   12 pApB
!
(G   L) + L.
Since pB > pA, his expected benefit from voting B is higher. Therefore, he votes for project
B. Since committee member 1 is investigating project A and voting for A if he gets G from the
project and voting for B otherwise, after paying the investigation cost, his expected benefit is
pA
(
1
2
G +
1
2
[pB(G   L) + L]
)
+ (1   pA)[pB(G   L) + L]   c
=
 
1
2
pA + pB   12 pApB
!
(G   L) + L   c.
If both committee members investigate project A, then
• with probability PA = p2A, both get G from project A;
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• with probability pA(1   pA), committee member 1 gets G and committee member 2 gets
L from project A;
• with probability pA(1   pA), committee member 1 gets L and committee member 2 gets
G from project A;
• with probability (1   pA)2, both get L from project A.
If a committee member gets G from project A, he votes for A; otherwise, he votes for B.
According to the decision rule, a project is approved if both committee members vote for it,
and the two projects are approved with equal probabilities if committee members disagree on
which project to approve. Since they both investigate project A, they pay cost c each and have
no information on project B. Hence, each committee member’s expected benefit is
p2AG + pA(1   pA)
(
1
2
G +
1
2
[pB(G   L) + L]
)
+ pA(1   pA)
(
1
2
L +
1
2
[pB(G   L) + L]
)
+ (1   pA)2[pB(G   L) + L]   c
=
 
1
2
p2A +
1
2
pA + pB   pApB
!
(G   L) + L   c.
The other cases can be analyzed similarly. Let   = G   L. Denote no investigation by
 , investigation of project A by IA, and investigation of project B by IB. Then, the expected
benefits can be summarized in the following table.
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In this case, each committee member is indi↵erent between investigating project A and
investigating project B, since investigating either would yield the same expected payo↵. Each
committee member investigates, if given the opportunity, if and only if his expected benefit
from investigating a project is at least as large as his expected benefit from rubber-stamping
project B; that is, investigating is a dominant strategy if and only if
1
2
pA(1   pB)(G   L)   c. (4.2)
Since the two committee members are identical and have common priors, both of them face
the same constraint and would simultaneously agree to investigate (if given the opportunity) or
not to investigate. Comparing inequality (4.2) with inequality (4.1) for the case of the dictator,
we find that the constraint on c is more restrictive in the case for two committee members
whose benefits are independent, so the two committee members do not investigate as often as
the dictator.
If the investigation cost c does not satisfy the constraint above, both committee members
prefer not to investigate, even if they receive detailed reports from the sponsors. Therefore,
there is nothing a sponsor can do to increase his project’s expected probability of approval by
the committee. Since both committee members view project B more favourably, they approve
project B.
Proposition 4.5.1 Let pB > pA. Suppose the investigation cost c is su ciently low, i.e. (4.2) is
satisfied.
1. If pA + pB > 1, each sponsor gives detailed reports to both committee members; the
expected payo↵s to the sponsors are (12 (1 + pA   pB)s, 12 (1   pA + pB)s).
2. If pA + pB < 1, only sponsor A gives committee members detailed reports; the expected
payo↵s to the sponsors are (pAs, (1   pA)s).
Proof Since c is su ciently low, both committee members prefer to investigate. If a committee
member is given detailed reports by both sponsors, he tosses a fair coin to decide which project
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to investigate since he is indi↵erent between investigating project A and investigating project
B. Sponsor j has the following options: provide no information about his project (denote this
strategy by   j), give a detailed report to committee member 1 (denote this by 1 j), give a detailed
report to committee member 2 (denote this by 2 j), or give detailed reports to both committee
members (denote this by {1, 2} j).
If both sponsors do not provide reports ( A,  B), committee members cannot investigate
even though they prefer to. Thus, they vote according to their priors. Since they both view
project B more favourably, project B is approved. Therefore, the sponsors’ payo↵s are (0, s).
If sponsor A gives a detailed report to committee member 1 only and sponsor B withholds
information (1A,  B), committee member 1 investigates project A and committee member 2 is
not allowed to investigate. Committee member 2 votes according to his priors and votes for
project B. Upon investigation, committee member 1 learns his benefit from project A and votes
accordingly: with probability pA, he gets G and votes A, so committee members toss a fair
coin to decide which project to approve; with probability (1   pA), he gets L and votes B, so
project B is approved. Therefore, project A is approved with probability 12 pA, and the sponsors’
payo↵s are (12 pAs, (1   12 pA)s).
If sponsor A provides reports to both committee members and sponsor B withholds infor-
mation ({1, 2}A,  B), then both committee members investigate project A since they prefer to
investigate and have only one report to investigate. Each committee member learns if project
A yields G or L for himself. If project A yields G, the committee member votes for project A;
if project A yields L, the committee member votes for project B.
• With probability PA = p2A, both get G from project A, so project A is approved.
• With probability pA(1   pA), committee member 1 gets G and committee member 2 gets
L from project A, so project A is approved half the time.
• With probability pA(1   pA), committee member 1 gets L and committee member 2 gets
G from project A, so project A is approved half the time.
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• With probability (1   pA)2, both get L from project A, so project B is approved.
The expected probability that project A is approved is thus
p2A +
1
2
pA(1   pA) + 12 pA(1   pA) = pA
and the expected probability that project B is approved is (1   pA). The sponsors’ payo↵s are
thus (pAs, (1   pA)s).
The other cases can be analyzed in a similar fashion.
102 Chapter 4. Competing for a committee’s approval
Sp
on
so
rB
 
1 B
2 B
{1,
2} B
Sp
on
so
rA
 
0, s
1 2
(1
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
+
p B
)s
1 2
(1
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
+
p B
)s
(1
 p
B
)s
,
p B
s
1 A
1 2
p A
s,
(1
 
1 2
p A
)s
1 4
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 4
(3
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 4
(3
+
p A
 3
p B
)s
,
1 4
(1
 p
A
+
3p
B
)s
2 A
1 2
p A
s,
(1
 
1 2
p A
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 4
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 4
(3
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 4
(3
+
p A
 3
p B
)s
,
1 4
(1
 p
A
+
3p
B
)s
{1,
2} A
p A
s,
(1
 p
A
)s
1 4
(1
+
3p
A
 p
B
)s
,
1 4
(3
 3
p A
+
p B
)s
1 4
(1
+
3p
A
 p
B
)s
,
1 4
(3
 3
p A
+
p B
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
Ta
bl
e
4.
4:
Pa
yo
↵
s
fo
rt
he
tw
o
sp
on
so
rs
fa
ci
ng
a
co
m
m
itt
ee
w
ith
tw
o
id
en
tic
al
m
em
be
rs
w
ith
in
de
pe
nd
en
tb
en
efi
ts
.
4.5. Two-member committee: identical members with independent benefits 103
If pA + pB > 1, {1, 2}A is a dominant strategy for sponsor A. The Nash equilibrium of
the game is ({1, 2}A, {1, 2}B), where both sponsors provide detailed reports to both committee
members.
However, if pA + pB < 1,  B is a dominant strategy for sponsor B. The Nash equilibrium
of the game is ({1, 2}A,  B), where sponsor A gives detailed reports to both committee members
and sponsor B withholds information.
We noted earlier in the section that constraint (4.2) on the investigation cost c is more re-
strictive for a two-member committee with independent benefits than for a one-member com-
mittee (see constraint (4.1)). As a result, if c is very low, i.e. it satisfies (4.2), competing
sponsors behave the same way and receive the same expected payo↵s regardless of the compo-
sition and size of the committee. However, if c is in an intermediate range, i.e. it satisfies (4.1)
but not (4.2), then identical committee members with independent benefits do not investigate,
so they vote according to their priors and approve project B. Therefore, the sponsors’ pay-
o↵s are (0, s) when facing a committee with two identical members with independent benefits,
rather than either (12(1 + pA   pB)s, 12 (1   pA + pB)s) or (pAs, (1   pA)s) which they would get
when facing a one-member committee. When c is very high, committee members in both cases
prefer not to investigate and they approve project B.
Committee size and composition are taken as given in this chapter. However, based on the
analysis above, the sponsor with the stronger project would be most interested in influencing
the investigation cost, and the composition and size of the committee. In particular, if c is in the
intermediate range, he would prefer the committee to consist of two identical members with
independent benefits rather than a dictatorial committee.
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4.6 Two-member committee: identical members with per-
fectly correlated benefits
Suppose there are two members in the committee (N = 2) with common priors (piA = pA, piB =
pB for all i). Now, consider the case where the committee members’ benefits are perfectly
correlated. That is, for j 2 {A, B}, the joint probability that both committee members benefit
from project j is Pj = Pr{r1 j = r2 j = G} = pj. As before, suppose pB > pA, since the case
where pA > pB is symmetric.
If none of the committee members investigates, both members vote according to their pri-
ors. Since they have common priors, they approve project B since they view project B more
favourably. With probability pB, a committee member gets G; with probability (1   pB), he
gets L. Therefore, his expected benefit from project B is
pBG + (1   pB)L = pB(G   L) + L.
Since committee members’ benefits are perfectly correlated, a committee member’s ability
to observe the outcome of the investigation carried out by the other committee member may
a↵ect his behaviour. Hence, we consider two scenarios:
1. Each committee member observes the outcome of the investigation carried out by the
other committee member. (Section 4.6.1)
2. Committee members do not observe the outcomes of other members’ investigations.
(Section 4.6.2)
We note that it is unnecessary to consider these two scenarios separately when committee
members’ benefits are independently distributed.
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4.6.1 Investigation results are observable
First, consider the case where each committee member observes the outcome of the investiga-
tion carried out by the other committee member. If a committee member investigates a project
and gets G from the project, the other committee member knows that he gets G from the same
project as well since benefits are perfectly correlated. Thus, they vote for the same project. On
the other hand, if the committee member who investigates learns that his benefit from a project
is L, the other committee member observes that he also gets L from that project, so they vote
for the other project.
If committee member 1 investigates project A and committee member 2 does not investi-
gate, then both committee members learn if they get G or L from project A. Since committee
member 1 carries out the investigation, he has to pay c; on the other hand, committee member
2 observes the outcome of committee member 1’s investigation, so he obtains the information
without incurring a cost. With probability pA, they get G from project A and approve project
A; with probability (1   pA), they get L from project A and approve project B. Since no one
investigates project B, a committee member’s expected benefit from project B is pB(G L)+L.
Committee member 1’s expected benefit is therefore
pAG + (1   pA)[pB(G   L) + L]   c = (pA + pB   pApB)(G   L) + L   c.
Committee member 2’s expected benefit is
pAG + (1   pA)[pB(G   L) + L] = (pA + pB   pApB)(G   L) + L.
The other cases can be analyzed similarly. Let   = G   L. Denoting no investigation by  ,
investigation of project A by IA, and investigation of project B by IB, the expected benefits are
summarized in the following table.
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Each committee member is indi↵erent between investigating project A and investigating
project B. If
pA(1   pB)(G   L) < c
the Nash equilibrium of the game is (No investigation, No investigation). Both committee
members vote according to their priors and approve project B.
However, if
pA(1   pB)(G   L)   c (4.3)
the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game are (No Investigation, Investigate A), (No Inves-
tigation, Investigate B), (Investigate A, No Investigation) and (Investigate B, No Investigation).
Proposition 4.6.1 Let pB > pA. Suppose the investigation cost c is su ciently low, i.e. (4.3) is
satisfied.
1. If pA + pB > 1, each sponsor gives detailed reports to both committee members; the
expected payo↵s to the sponsors are (12 (1 + pA   pB)s, 12 (1   pA + pB)s).
2. If pA+ pB < 1, sponsor A is indi↵erent between giving information to committee member
1, committee member 2, or both committee members; sponsor B withholds information.
The expected payo↵s to the sponsors are (pAs, (1   pA)s).
Proof Sponsor j has the following options: provide no information about his project (denote
this strategy by   j), give a detailed report to committee member 1 (denote this by 1 j), give
a detailed report to committee member 2 (denote this by 2 j), or give detailed reports to both
committee members (denote this by {1, 2} j).
If both sponsors do not provide information, committee members vote according to their
priors. Since they both view project B more favourably, project B is approved. Therefore, the
sponsors’ payo↵s are (0, s).
If sponsor A gives a detailed report to committee member 1 only and sponsor B withholds
information (1A,  B), committee member 1 investigates project A and committee member 2
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observes the investigation result. Since committee members’ benefits are perfectly correlated,
committee member 2 also votes for project A if project A yields G to committee member 1.
Otherwise, both committee members vote for project B. Thus, project A is approved with
probability pA and project B is approved with probability (1   pA). The sponsors’ payo↵s are
(pAs, (1   pA)s).
If sponsor A gives information to both committee members and sponsor B withholds infor-
mation ({1, 2}A,  B), committee members play one of the pure strategy Nash equilibria where
only one member investigates project A. Since committee members’ benefits are perfectly
correlated, if project A yields G to the investigating committee member, the other committee
member also votes for project A. Otherwise, both committee members vote for project B. Thus,
project A is approved with probability pA and project B is approved with probability (1   pA).
The sponsors’ payo↵s are (pAs, (1   pA)s).
The other cases can be analyzed in a similar manner.
4.6. Two-member committee: identical members with perfectly correlated benefits 109
Sp
on
so
rB
 
1 B
2 B
{1,
2} B
Sp
on
so
rA
 
0, s
(1
 p
B
)s
,
p B
s
(1
 p
B
)s
,
p B
s
(1
 p
B
)s
,
p B
s
1 A
p A
s,
(1
 p
A
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 4
(3
+
p A
 3
p B
)s
,
1 4
(1
 p
A
+
3p
B
)s
2 A
p A
s,
(1
 p
A
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
1 4
(3
+
p A
 3
p B
)s
,
1 4
(1
 p
A
+
3p
B
)s
{1,
2} A
p A
s,
(1
 p
A
)s
1 4
(1
+
3p
A
 p
B
)s
,
1 4
(3
 3
p A
+
p B
)s
1 4
(1
+
3p
A
 p
B
)s
,
1 4
(3
 3
p A
+
p B
)s
1 2
(1
+
p A
 p
B
)s
,
1 2
(1
 p
A
+
p B
)s
Ta
bl
e
4.
6:
Pa
yo
↵
s
fo
rt
w
o
sp
on
so
rs
fa
ci
ng
a
co
m
m
itt
ee
w
ith
tw
o
id
en
tic
al
m
em
be
rs
w
ith
pe
rf
ec
tly
co
rr
el
at
ed
be
ne
fit
s
an
d
in
ve
st
ig
at
io
n
re
su
lts
ar
e
ob
se
rv
ab
le
.
110 Chapter 4. Competing for a committee’s approval
If pA + pB > 1, {1, 2}A is a dominant strategy for sponsor A. The Nash equilibrium of
the game is ({1, 2}A, {1, 2}B), where both sponsors provide detailed reports to both committee
members.
However, if pA + pB < 1,  B is a dominant strategy for sponsor B. The Nash equilibria of
the game are (1A,  B), (2A,  B) and ({1, 2}A,  B); sponsor A gives detailed reports to one of the
committee members or both committee members, and sponsor B withholds information.
Constraint (4.3) on the investigation cost c is the same as for a dictator in the committee
(constraint (4.1)). Note that the results of Proposition 4.6.1 are almost identical to Proposi-
tion 4.4.1. Sponsor A is indi↵erent between providing information to committee member 1,
committee member 2, or both committee members, because committee members are identical
with perfectly correlated benefits and have the ability to observe results from investigations
carried out by one another. Not surprisingly, under perfect correlation of benefits, a committee
with two identical members who can observe each other’s investigation result is equivalent to
a committee with only one member.
Instead of a committee member being able to observe another committee member’s inves-
tigation result, the same results can be obtained by allowing committee members to commu-
nicate before voting. Gerardi and Yariv (2003) find that, in large committees where members
communicate prior to voting, each member has an incentive to save the investigation cost and
benefit from the other members’ investigations. In this chapter, even though there are only two
committee members, there is also free riding of one committee member on the investigative
e↵ort of the other committee member. Since the benefits are perfectly correlated, free riding
does not adversely a↵ect the outcome because the free rider votes for the project that is in the
interest of the committee member who investigated.
4.6.2 Investigation results are not observable
Now, suppose a committee member does not observe the outcome of the investigation carried
out by the other committee member before voting.
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If committee member 1 investigates project A and committee member 2 does not investi-
gate, then committee member 1 learns if he gets G or L from project A. He votes for A if he
knows he will get G and votes for B otherwise. Therefore, he votes for A with probability pA
and votes for B with probability (1   pA).
Committee member 2 has no information, so he votes for the project that would give him
a higher expected payo↵. First, consider the case where he votes A. With probability pA, both
committee members vote for A; with probability (1   pA), committee member 1 votes for B,
so project A is approved with probability
1
2
and project B is approved with probability
1
2
. His
expected benefit is
pAG + (1   pA)
(
1
2
L +
1
2
[pB(G   L) + L]
)
= (pA +
1
2
pB   12 pApB)(G   L) + L.
Now, consider the case where he votes B. With probability pA, committee member 1 votes A,
so project A is approved with probability
1
2
and project B is approved with probability
1
2
; with
probability (1   pA), committee member 1 also votes for B, so B is approved. His expected
benefit is thus
pA
(
1
2
G +
1
2
[pB(G   L) + L]
)
+ (1   pA)[pB(G   L) + L]
= (
1
2
pA + pB   12 pApB)(G   L) + L.
Since pB > pA, his expected benefit from voting B is higher. Consequently, he votes for project
B. Since committee member 1 is investigating project A and voting for A if he gets G from the
project and voting for B otherwise, his expected benefit after paying the investigation cost is
pA
(
1
2
G +
1
2
[pB(G   L) + L]
)
+ (1   pA)[pB(G   L) + L]   c
= (
1
2
pA + pB   12 pApB)(G   L) + L   c.
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If both committee members investigate project A, then both get G with probability pA and
both get L with probability (1   pA) from project A since benefits are perfectly correlated.
Since they both investigate project A, they pay cost c each and have no information on project
B. Hence, each committee member’s expected benefit is
pAG + (1   pA)[pB(G   L) + L]   c = (pA + pB   pApB)(G   L) + L   c.
The other cases can be analyzed similarly. Let   = G   L. Denoting no investigation by  ,
investigation of project A by IA, and investigation of project B by IB, the expected benefits are
summarized in the following table.
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Each committee member is indi↵erent between investigating project A and investigating
project B, since investigating either would yield the same expected payo↵. Investigating is a
dominant strategy if and only if
1
2
pA(1   pB)(G   L)   c. (4.4)
Comparing this constraint on c with inequality (4.1) from the case of the dictator, we find that
the constraint on c is more restrictive in this case, so committee members do not investigate
as often as the dictator; this constraint is the same as the constraint (4.2) for the case with two
identical members with independent benefits.
If the investigation cost c does not satisfy the constraint above, then both committee mem-
bers prefer not to investigate, even if they received detailed reports from the sponsors. Since
both committee members view project B more favourably, they approve project B.
Proposition 4.6.2 Let pB > pA. Suppose the investigation cost c is su ciently low, i.e. (4.4) is
satisfied.
1. If pA + pB > 1, each sponsor gives detailed reports to both committee members; the
expected payo↵s to the sponsors are (12 (1 + pA   pB)s, 12 (1   pA + pB)s).
2. If pA + pB < 1, only sponsor A gives committee members detailed reports; the expected
payo↵s to the sponsors are (pAs, (1   pA)s).
Proof Since c is su ciently low, both committee members prefer to investigate. If a committee
member is given detailed reports by both sponsors, he tosses a fair coin to decide which project
to investigate since he is indi↵erent between investigating project A and investigating project
B. Sponsor j has the following options: provide no information about his project (denote this
strategy by   j), give a detailed report to committee member 1 (denote this by 1 j), give a detailed
report to committee member 2 (denote this by 2 j), or give detailed reports to both committee
members (denote this by {1, 2} j).
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If both sponsors do not provide reports ( A,  B), committee members cannot investigate
even though they prefer to. Thus, they vote according to their priors. Since they both view
project B more favourably, project B is approved. Therefore, the sponsors’ payo↵s are (0, s).
Suppose sponsor A gives a detailed report to committee member 1 only and sponsor B
withholds information (1A,  B). Committee member 2 votes according to his priors and votes
for project B. Upon investigation, committee member 1 learns his benefit from project A and
votes accordingly: with probability pA, he gets G and votes A, so committee members toss a
fair coin to decide which project to approve; with probability (1  pA), he gets L and votes B, so
project B is approved. Therefore, project A is approved with probability 12 pA, and the sponsors’
payo↵s are (12 pAs, (1   12 pA)s).
If sponsor A provides reports to both committee members and sponsor B withholds infor-
mation ({1, 2}A,  B), then both committee members investigate project A since they prefer to
investigate and have only one report to investigate. With probability pA, both committee mem-
bers learn that they getG from project A and approve project A; with probability (1  pA), both
committee members learn that they get L from project A and approve project B. The sponsors’
payo↵s are (pAs, (1   pA)s).
The other cases can be analyzed in a similar manner.
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If pA + pB > 1, {1, 2}A is a dominant strategy for sponsor A. The Nash equilibrium of
the game is ({1, 2}A, {1, 2}B), where both sponsors provide detailed reports to both committee
members.
However, if pA + pB < 1,  B is a dominant strategy for sponsor B. The Nash equilibrium
of the game is ({1, 2}A,  B), where sponsor A gives detailed reports to both committee members
and sponsor B withholds information.
Constraint (4.4) is the same as constraint (4.2) for a committee with two identical members
with independent benefits. Note that the equilibria are also the same in both cases. To the
sponsors, a committee with two identical members with independent benefits is equivalent
to a committee with two identical members with perfectly correlated benefits if committee
members cannot observe each other’s investigation result. Intuitively, this makes sense because
the inability to observe another committee member’s investigation result leads to committee
members acting independently, even though benefits are perfectly correlated. This is similar to
committee members not being allowed to communicate before voting.
The sponsor with the weaker project prefers very low c so that committee members may
be persuaded to investigate and approve his project. Thus, such a sponsor may be induced
to dedicate resources to decrease the investigation cost for the committee members. In this
chapter, we have assumed, as Caillaud and Tirole (2007) have, that sponsors are not allowed to
bribe committee members. However, bribes to committee members, if allowed, may be a way
to decrease the investigation cost that committee members incur.
On the other hand, the sponsor with the stronger project likes c to be at least in the inter-
mediate range. Hence, he is unlikely to dedicate resources to bribe committee members even
if he is allowed to. In addition, he prefers a committee with two identical members with ei-
ther independent benefits or, if investigation results cannot be observed, perfectly correlated
benefits.
In the cases considered thus far, the weaker sponsor always provides information whereas
the strong sponsor withholds information if his opponent is rather weak and provides infor-
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mation if his opponent is strong. A more competitive environment induces more information
revelation. This is in contrast with Perez-Richet (2012), where weaker candidates are required
for full disclosure of information, and Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017), where the e↵ect of
competition on information revelation is ambiguous in general.
For the sponsor who is the a priori favourite, as the probability that his project yields G for
the committee members increases, he switches from withholding information on his project
to providing detailed reports to the committee members. Rather than relying on the oppo-
nent’s project yielding L for the committee members, the a priori favourite sponsor allows the
committee members to investigate his project if the probability of his project yieldingG is suf-
ficiently high. This is in contrast with Caillaud and Tirole (2007) where a sponsor relies on the
committee to rubberstamp his project when the committee has su ciently high priors about
his project.
4.7 Two-member committee: general case
Let there be two members in the committee (N = 2) with diverse priors. Suppose that a com-
mittee member can observe the other committee member’s investigation results. Committee
member i has priors piA and piB about project A and project B respectively. Let committee
members’ benefits be positively correlated. In particular, for j 2 {A, B}, if the joint probability
that both committee members benefit from project j is Pj = Pr{r1 j = r2 j = G}, assume that the
Bayesian update of the prior on ri j conditional on the other member benefiting from project j
is larger than pi j, i.e. cpi j = Pr{ri j = G|rk j = G} = Pjpk j > pi j.
This assumption implies that the Bayesian update of the prior on ri j conditional on the other
member getting L from project j is fpi j = Pr{ri j = G|rk j = L} = pi j   Pj1   pk j < pi j.
Suppose both committee members view project A more favourably: p1A > p1B and p2A >
p2B. By the assumptions on Pj, we know the following inequalities hold:
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• cp1A > p1A > p1B > gp1B
• cp2A > p2A > p2B > gp2B
In addition, assume that each committee member has priors that are relatively close to each
other such that the priors and updated beliefs are ordered in the following way:
• p1B > gp1A
• cp1B > p1A
• p2B > gp2A
• cp2B > p2A
If none of the committee members investigates, both members vote according to their pri-
ors. Since both committee members view project A more favourably, they approve project
A. With probability piA, committee member i gets G; with probability (1   piA), committee
member i gets L. Therefore, committee member i’s expected benefit from project A is
piAG + (1   piA)L = piA(G   L) + L.
If committee member 1 investigates project A and project member 2 does not investigate at
all, committee member 1 learns if he getsG or L from project A and votes accordingly. Hence,
he votes for project A with probability p1A and votes for project B with probability (1   p1A).
Committee member 2’s vote depends on which project gives him a higher expected payo↵.
With probability p1A, committee member 1 votes for project A. If committee member 2 votes
for project A too, his expected benefit is cp2A(G   L) + L. However, if committee member 2
votes for project B, project A is approved with probability
1
2
and project B is approved with
probability
1
2
. Therefore, his expected benefit is 12(cp2A + p2B)(G   L) + L. Since cp2A > p2B
by assumption, committee member 2 votes for project A. On the other hand, with probability
(1   p1A), committee member 1 votes for project B. If committee member 2 votes for project
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A, project A is approved with probability
1
2
and project B is approved with probability
1
2
.
Therefore, his expected benefit is 12(gp2A + p2B)(G   L) + L. However, if committee member 2
votes for project B too, project B is approved and his expected benefit is p2B(G   L) + L. Since
p2B > gp2A by assumption, committee member 2 votes for project B.
Consequently, committee member 1’s expected benefit is
p1AG + (1   p1A)[p1B(G   L) + L]   c = (p1A + p1B   p1Ap1B)(G   L) + L   c
and committee member 2’s expected benefit is
p1A[cp2A(G   L) + L] + (1   p1A)[p2B(G   L) + L] = (PA + p2B   p1Ap2B)(G   L) + L.
Let   = G   L. Denoting no investigation by  i, investigation of project A by IiA, and
investigation of project B by IiB, the other cases are analyzed similarly and summarized in the
following table.
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Each committee member is indi↵erent between investigating project A and investigating
project B. Investigating is a dominant strategy for committee member 1 if and only if
p1B(1   p1A)(G   L)   c (4.5)
1
2
(p1A   p1Ap1B + p1Bp2A   PA)(G   L)   c (4.6)
1
2
(p1B   p1Ap1B + p1Ap2B   PB)(G   L)   c (4.7)
Investigating is a dominant strategy for committee member 2 if and only if
p2B(1   p2A)(G   L)   c (4.8)
1
2
(p2A   p2Ap2B + p1Ap2B   PA)(G   L)   c (4.9)
1
2
(p2B   p2Ap2B + p1Bp2A   PB)(G   L)   c (4.10)
Evidently, the constraints on the investigation cost c are more complicated for a multi-
member committee with diverse priors. If c satisfies none of the above constraints, both com-
mittee members prefer not to investigate, even if they receive detailed reports from the spon-
sors. Since both committee members view project A more favourably, they approve project
A.
Proposition 4.7.1 Suppose the above assumptions on p1A, p1B, p2A, p2B, PA and PB hold.
Suppose the investigation cost c is su ciently low, i.e. (4.5)-(4.10) are satisfied. Also assume
the following:
• p1A + p1B < 1
• p2A + p2B < 1
• p1A + p2B < 1
• p1B + p2A < 1
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Then, sponsor A withholds information and sponsor B provides a detailed report to the commit-
tee member who views project B more favourably. The sponsors’ payo↵s are ((1   piB)s, piBs),
where i is such that piB > pkB.
Proof Since c is su ciently low, committee members prefer to investigate when given the
choice. Sponsor j can then try to influence committee members into voting for project j by
taking one of the following actions: withhold information (denoted by   j), give committee
member 1 a detailed report (denoted by 1 j), give committee member 2 a detailed report (de-
noted by 2 j), or give both committee members detailed reports (denoted by {1, 2} j).
If both sponsors withhold information ( A,  B), committee members can only vote based
on their priors. Since both committee members view project A more favourably, project A is
approved. Therefore, the sponsors’ payo↵s are (s, 0).
Suppose sponsor A gives a detailed report to committee member 1 only and sponsor B
withholds information (1A,  B). Committee member 1 investigates project A and committee
member 2 votes according to her updated beliefs. With probability p1A, committee member 1
learns that project A yields G and votes for project A; committee member 2 votes for project A
too since cp2A > p2B. Therefore, project A is approved with probability p1A. With probability
(1  p1A), committee member 1 learns that project A yields L and votes for project B; committee
member 2 votes for project B too since p2B > gp2A. Therefore, project B is approved with
probability (1   p1A). The sponsors’ payo↵s are (p1As, (1   p1A)s).
The other cases are analyzed in a similar manner.
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If the four inequalities stated in the proposition hold, withholding information is a dominant
strategy for sponsor A. The Nash equilibrium of the game is ( A, iB), where i is such that
committee member i’s prior on project B is higher. That is, sponsor B gives a detailed report to
committee member 1 if p1B > p2B, and vice versa.
Proposition 4.7.1 examines a particular case of two competing sponsors persuading a two-
member committee with diverse priors and positively correlated benefits. The sponsors’ be-
haviours in equilibrium demonstrates that selective communication and persuasion cascades
are indeed persuasion strategies that sponsors rely upon in group persuasion.
Clearly, there are many other cases to consider before we have a complete characterization
of sponsors’ behaviours when the committee consists of two members with diverse priors. We
state the result of this case so that the reader has an indication of how the competition between
two sponsors may play out, and leave the generalization of results to further research.
Although the results of Proposition 4.7.1 require many more assumptions on the priors,
correlation structure and investigation cost, we note that the sponsor with the stronger project
prefers to withhold information and to rely on committee members investigating and learning
that the other project yields L when the priors on his own project are su ciently low, as in
earlier sections when we considered a dictatorial committee and a two-member committee
with common priors.
This proposition also gives an indication of how non-trivial it is to completely analyze the
group persuasion game with a general two-member committee and two competing sponsors.
4.8 Conclusion
Many decisions in large organizations are made by groups, but the economics literature has
little to say about group persuasion. This chapter is an attempt to study some aspects of group
persuasion with competing sponsors of projects.
By introducing a model with two senders and a N-member committee, where N 2 {1, 2},
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we find that a committee with two identical members with independent benefits is equivalent to
a committee with two identical members with perfectly correlated benefits, when investigation
results are not observed by others. On the other hand, a dictatorial committee is equivalent
to a committee with two identical members who can observe each other’s investigation result,
if members’ benefits are perfectly correlated. Identical members of a two-member committee
with independent benefits face a more restrictive constraint on the investigation cost than a
dictator, so they investigate projects less often. If the committee is equivalent to one with two
identical members with independent benefits, rather than a dictatorial committee, the sponsor
with the stronger project benefits. In addition, competing sponsors have di↵erent preferences
on the investigation cost incurred by committee members: the sponsor with the weaker project
prefers a very low investigation cost, whereas the sponsor with the stronger project prefers a
high investigation cost.
There are still many open questions in this research field.
For a general two-member committee, there are too many di↵erent cases to analyze for this
chapter. A complete characterization of sponsors’ behaviours is still required.
In the model considered in this chapter, we specified a voting rule that is symmetric. Both
committee members are pivotal in this voting model because each can increase the probability
of approval for the project that he likes. Results may vary as the voting rule is changed. For ex-
ample, if there is a status quo that yields 0 to every sponsor and every committee member, and
this status quo is adopted whenever there is no unanimity in the committee, committee mem-
bers may no longer be indi↵erent between project investigations. Since committee members’
behaviours change, sponsors’ behaviours may also change.
Caillaud and Tirole (2007) take a mechanism design approach to study group persuasion
with one sponsor. In this chapter, we specified a game instead of taking a mechanism design
approach, because it is not entirely obvious how a mechanism design approach would work
with multiple sponsors and two committee members. Yamashita (2010) considers a class of
mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents; he notes that the re-
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sult is ambiguous if there are only two agents. Caillaud and Tirole also note that building
an equilibrium-mechanism-design methodology for competing sponsors is a very challenging
endeavour.
These and other open questions related to group persuasion are left to future research.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
My thesis consists of three essays related to the problems of using microeconomic models to
find optimal solutions in multilateral settings. The first two essays deal with the e↵ects of
resale after simultaneous ascending auctions. The third essay investigates the dynamics of
group persuasion.
Chapter 2 deals with the challenges of allocating multiple heterogeneous objects e ciently
where speculation by bidders is not allowed. Simultaneous ascending auctions have been used
to allocate multiple heterogeneous objects, such as electromagnetic spectrum licences. As the
objects are auctioned separately yet simultaneously, a global bidder faces the exposure prob-
lem. The upshot is that the allocation after a simultaneous ascending auction may be ine cient.
I use a fixed resale mechanism to study the e↵ects of resale and find an equilibrium in which
resale improves the allocation e ciency relative to the benchmark equilibrium without resale.
However, this fixed resale mechanism can only partially mitigate the exposure problem for
the global bidder. This is because, with the fixed resale mechanism, resale never takes place
when the objects are ine ciently allocated to the local bidders. However, when the objects are
ine ciently allocated to the global bidder, he can resell the objects to the local bidders.
Chapter 3 shows that allowing speculation by local bidders in a simultaneous ascending
auction is not necessarily detrimental to the allocation e ciency. Since bans on post-auction
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trade are di cult to enforce, some local bidders who are already participating in a simultane-
ous ascending auction may wish to make a profit through post-auction trade with other bidders.
I look for the existence of e cient resale mechanisms that can be used at the resale stage after
the simultaneous ascending auction. Even when the speculators win the objects at the auction,
there exist e cient resale mechanisms that can restore e ciency. Therefore, if allocation e -
ciency is the desired outcome, restricting participation in the simultaneous ascending auction
to bidders who have positive values for the objects only may not necessarily be optimal.
Chapter 4 investigates the dynamics of group persuasion which can be richer than the dy-
namics of persuading a single decision maker. While persuading a group, selective communi-
cation and persuasion cascades may be used. A committee decides to implement one of two
projects. A sponsor of a project can provide information on his project to select committee
members. If a committee member receives information from a sponsor, he can investigate
that project at a cost and learn his own payo↵ from implementing that project. I consider cases
where other committee members may or may not observe the results of his investigation. Then,
the committee members vote which project to approve. I find that the a priori weaker sponsor
always provides information to the committee, whereas the a prior favourite sponsor withholds
information if the other project is weak enough and relies on the committee to rubberstamp
his project. As the competition between sponsors gets stronger, there is more information
disclosure from the sponsors to the committee members.
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